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Abstract
This thesis aims to explore the disconnect between calls for safe zones as a tool of
humanitarian intervention, and the dark history of safe zone failure. This thesis begins with a
brief discussion of current calls for safe zones in Syria, and how a proper theoretical framework
and historical understanding are needed to discuss whether or not safe zones can be successfully
implemented in Syria. The following literature review discusses not only prominent academic
arguments and the history of humanitarian intervention, but it suggests a framework for
deconstructing case studies. This framework looks first at the interests of an intervening actor.
The level of interest of that actor directly informs its willingness to overcome the challenges of
safe zone implementation. The challenges of safe zone implementation are both practical and
existential. If an actor’s interest in a given crisis is not great enough to make it willing to
overcome these practical and existential challenges, or the actor is willing to overcome them but
lacks the ability to do so, the safe zone will fail. In most cases of failed safe zones, moral hazard
plays a role. Moral hazard can be evident in either the intervening actor’s decisions or the
decisions of the international community to support or not support the intervention. This thesis
then deconstructs three historical cases of safe zones with this method: Srebrenica in Bosnia,
Operation Provide Comfort in Iraqi Kurdistan, and Operation Turquoise in Rwanda. Following
these three case studies, this paper discusses safe zones in Syria with the help of this method and
the broad historical understanding of safe zones established through the case studies. This thesis
concludes with a discussion of how the analysis and available historical cases show that safe
zones are dangerous tools of humanitarian intervention and should not be undertaken without
adequate levels of interest and willingness to address challenges.
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Introduction
Since its beginning in 2011, the civil war in Syria has claimed 400,000 lives at a
minimum.1 The conflict is marked by some of the most horrendous images of modern times;
cities razed to the ground, refugees braving open oceans to find safety, and citizens murdered by
chemical weapons. Even as it seems the war might be coming to an end, the final rebel
stronghold at Idlib where an estimated three million civilians have fled stands between Assad
and victory.2 In September of 2018, Turkish and Russian forces reached an agreement to
establish Idlib as a demilitarized zone where “Russian forces… patrol the edge of the rebel-held
province while the Turkish army… [operates] in the demilitarized zone.”3 The demilitarized
zone and ceasefire in Idlib, however, are beginning to fray as Turkey flounders in achieving its
promises of vacating rebel groups from the city. Facing this tenuous situation, with the lives of
millions of civilians potentially hanging in the balance, safe zones have come up as a possible
solution to the situation.
Throughout the entirety of the conflict, not just in these last few months, discussion of
safe zones has been prevalent. During the second presidential debate between Hillary Clinton
and Donald Trump in October 2016, the moderator asked, “If you were president, what would
you do about Syria and the humanitarian crisis in Aleppo?4” Clinton responded, “Well, the
situation in Syria is catastrophic… So I, when I was Secretary of State, I advocated and I

Megan Specia, “How Syria’s Death Toll Is Lost in the Fog of War,” New York Times, April 13, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/world/middleeast/syria-death-toll.html.
2
Jeremy Bowen, “Sense of an ending for Syria’s war on Idlib front line,” BBC News, October 9, 2018,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45796263.
3
“Turkey and Russia hold joint patrols in Syria’s Idlib,” Aljazeera, March 8, 2019,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/turkey-russia-hold-joint-patrols-syria-idlib-190308113441646.html.
4
“US Debate: Clinton and Trump Clash Over Syrian War,” Aljazeera, October 10, 2016,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/debate-clinton-trump-clash-syrian-war-161010093723691.html
1
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advocate today, a no-fly zone and safe zones.5” This seemingly simple and reasonable
suggestion contains more complexity and history than is immediately evident in Clinton’s
remarks. Safe zones are, in the historical record, one of the most fraught tools of humanitarian
intervention available. They are widely-called for and generally accepted as positive by the
international community, despite their complicated track record.
Safe zones cannot and should not be discussed outside of a theoretical and historical
framework. Discussion of them as a tool is a uniquely visceral subject; there is so much surface
appeal, and at a glance, the idea of them is deceptively clear. The thought of safe zones evokes
the idea of a light at the end of a tunnel. This notion, however, is false. Layers of tragedy,
misuse, and insurmountable complexity shroud the history of safe zones. Never once have safe
zones been implemented as effortlessly or beneficially as international leaders appear to suggest.
The failure of the UN safe zone at Srebrenica, for example, remains the worst atrocity committed
on European soil since the end of WWII. Yet Clinton called for the implementation of safe
zones in Syria, and leaders across the globe echoed her suggestion, leaving her with strange
bedfellows in this suggested policy.
Senator Marco Rubio penned an article for Foreign Policy arguing that “we should also
work with our allies, particularly with neighboring states such as Jordan and Turkey, to set up
safe zones in border regions of Syria.”6 The Turkish government also voiced support for the
creation of safe zones in Syria, bolstered by similar comments from the former French President,
Francois Hollande, and the UK’s current Foreign Secretary.7 Merkel joined the group of

5

Ibid.
Marco Rubio, “It’s Not Too Late to Save Iraq and Syria,” Foreign Policy, August 25, 2015,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/25/its-not-too-late-to-save-iraq-and-syria-marco-rubuio/.
7
Dion Nissenbaum, Ayla Albayrak, and Nour Malas, “World News: U.S. Sends Mixed Signals on Syria Safe Zone -- Turkey’s Push for Buffer Area for Refugees Along Syrian Border is Backed by France; Americans Offer Varied
6
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individuals in favor of implementing safe zones, vocally supporting the creation of ‘humanitarian
harbors’ on the Syrian side of the Turkish-Syrian border.8 Robert Gates, Obama’s former
Secretary of Defense, even suggested that safe zones were the only tool available to ameliorate
the humanitarian disaster created by the civil war.9
President Trump has also shown shifting views on the subject. In a 2015 campaign rally,
he stated, “in Syria, take a big swatch of land… What I'd like is build a safe zone, it’s here, build
a big beautiful safe zone.”10 He reaffirmed this stance two years later, saying in an interview with
NBC that he will, “absolutely do safe zones in Syria for the people.”11 The Washington Post
leaked an early draft of Executive Order 13769 that included the instruction, “the Secretary of
State, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, is directed within 90 days of the date of this
order to produce a plan to provide safe areas in Syria.”12 The stipulation was removed from the
final version of the order, however, and over two years into Trump’s presidency, no safe zones
have been established.
Trump was not alone in his period of reluctance to implement safe zones in Syria. Two
prominent parties also oppose them: former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid
Ra'ad Al Hussein, and Syrian rebel leaders. In a February 2018 address, Al Hussein warned that
“the term 'de-escalation area' [was] becoming all too reminiscent of the so-called ‘safe areas’ in

Messages, “The Wall Street Journal, October 9, 2014, https://search-proquestcom.ccl.idm.oclc.org/docview/1609266925?accountid=10141.
8
Ercan Gurses and Andreas Rinke, “Germany seeking ‘safe zones’ in Syria to shelter refugees,” Reuters, April 23,
2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-turkey-germany-idUSKCN0XK0BS.
9
Kristina Wong, “McCain backs Clinton’s call for a no-fly zone in Syria,” The Hill, October 10, 2015,
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/257406-mccain-backs-clintons-call-for-a-no-fly-zone-in-syria.
10
Ali Vitali, “Donald Trump: Gove Syrian Refugees ‘Swatch of Land’ for Safe Zone,” NBC News, November 16,
2015, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/trump-give-syrian-refugees-swatch-land-safe-zone-n464586.
11
Julia Edwards Ainsley and Matt Spetalnick, “Trump says he will order ‘safe zones’ for Syria,” Reuters, January
25, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-syria-safezones-idUSKBN1592O8.
12
“Read the draft of executive order on immigration and refugees,” The Washington Post,
https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/read-the-draft-of-the-executive-order-on-immigration-andrefugees/2289/.
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Bosnia.”13 Al Hussein’s calls for an end to de-escalation zones are founded in two reasons. The
first is the historical precedent of their failure, and the second is their use as a band-aid that
allows the international community to channel efforts into addressing a symptom of the conflict,
and not its cause.14 For their part, Syrian rebel leaders rejected a May 2017 Russian plan to
implement safe zones on grounds that it was, “a threat to the country’s territorial integrity.”15
There is a unique and uniquely tangled web of motivations and beliefs that dictate the
positions of everyone involved in the question of safe zones in Syria. What scenario could place
Hillary Clinton, Vladimir Putin, Marco Rubio, and Angela Merkel together in support of a
proposition opposed by a former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights? There are many
answers to this question, and they lie in the varied motivations for, and complexities of, these
widespread calls for safe zones. There is, of course, extensive international desire to offer
humanitarian aid to civilians in conflict zones, but countries also have vested interests in calling
for safe zones. Additionally, with the implementation of safe zones, there are questions
surrounding which actor could create and enforce them, and how it would do so, which
inevitably become political questions. Through this politicization, safe zones become even more
complicated and nuanced.
The question of safe zones in Syria is ultimately a quagmire. To break down this puzzle
in a productive way that could inform a policy recommendation for rendering humanitarian aid
in Syria, a method to evaluate case studies of safe zones is necessary. Theoretical material
regarding safe zones, humanitarian intervention, and relevant international law on the subject are

“UN rights chief urges international action as violence soars in Syria,” United Nations Human Rights: Office of
the High Commissioner, February 10, 2018,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22647.
14
Ibid.
15
Dmitry Solovyov, “Syrian rebels reject Russia’s proposal for safe zones,” Reuters, May 4, 2017,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-safezones-opposition-idUSKBN1801TF.
13
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not sufficient in informing appropriate courses of action in Syria. This insufficiency is due to the
fact that no two historical examples of safe zones are the same; they are not implemented by
similar actors, they do not take analogous forms, they are not established during comparable
conflicts, they do not face similar problems, and they do not have similar outcomes. In order to
properly understand safe zones, and both the problems they face and their historical strengths
and downfalls, case studies provide a more effective method than theoretical models and
scholarly material alone. This thesis does not seek to define safe zones or compare them exactly
to one another, rather it seeks to apply a set method of analysis to four case studies, and
ultimately, from this analysis, draw conclusions about the viability of safe zones as a policy tool.
This thesis is divided into three main sections. A literature review follows this
introduction, exploring the relevant writing on the subject and establishing a basic understanding
of the history of humanitarian intervention and its difficulties. The literature review concludes by
proposing a method for analyzing case studies so they can be considered systematically and with
a logical progression. The method analyzes the interests of various actors involved in the
creation of a specific safe zone. An actor’s level of interest directly informs its willingness to
overcome the challenges of implementing a safe zone, which are necessarily extensive. Notably,
a willingness to execute a safe zone does not inherently mean that the actor has the ability to do
so. Moral hazard additionally plays a role in interventions where there is a mismatch between
interest, willingness, and practical challenges. This moral hazard can appeal to both the
intervening actor and the international community.
Once this method is established, this paper will consider three case studies: Srebrenica in
Bosnia, Operation Provide Comfort in Iraqi Kurdistan, and Operation Turquoise in Rwanda.
These three cases have been chosen specifically because they represent unique and varied

10

intersections of interest, will, ability, and outcome. They additionally comprise a broad
geographical area and three separate modes of implementation. Peacekeepers implemented the
safe area in Bosnia, the U.S. military in concert with a multinational coalition undertook the safe
zone in northern Iraq, and France carried out its humanitarian intervention in Rwanda alone.
These case studies will be discussed historically, and then analyzed through the established
method. Each case study will provide different insights into safe zones and offer unique
conclusions regarding the legitimacy and efficacy of safe zones as a tool of humanitarian
intervention. Following the exploration of each of these cases, this thesis will consider the case
of Syria and the current calls for safe zones in the northwestern part of the country. The
conclusions from the other case studies will inform this consideration of the actors involved in
the Syrian civil war, their interests, and their will to overcome specific barriers. The chapter will
ultimately conclude whether or not safe zones could be successful in Syria.
The lessons learned from these four scenarios will then be extrapolated into a larger
discussion regarding the viability of safe zones in future conflict. This discussion will consider
the patterns of interest and willingness to overcome obstacles apparent in each of these cases,
and how those considerations inform the success or failure of safe zones. The conclusion will
ultimately comment on whether or not these inherent relationships between interest and will, and
will and success, should inform the continued use of safe zones, or if the cases and evidence
explored point to the opposite conclusion.
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Literature Review
In Safety Zones and International Protection: A Dark Grey Area, Karin Landgren wrote of
the 20th century:
It is a truism to note that the waging of war has changed: at the beginning of this
century, 90% of war casualties were military; now, 90% are civilians. Following the end
of the Cold War, conflicts have been overwhelmingly internal and have often had as their
explicit objective the displacement or elimination of rival ethnic or communal groups. The
belligerents appear unfamiliar with or not interested in
international humanitarian law, and
less susceptible to international condemnation.
They may see little relevance in the
distinction between civilians and combatants.16
Landgren is plainly asserting that war used to kill soldiers, but now conflict kills civilians. UNICEF
suggests that this shift is due to a change in the structure of war; where conflict used to be between
two professional armies, now wars are often a, “[grinding struggle] between military and civilians
in the same country, or between hostile groups of armed civilians. More and more wars are
essentially low-intensity internal conflicts, and they are lasting longer.”17 It is additionally
important to note that the seeds for this shift in the groups that are mainly harmed by war began in
the early 20th century. Civilians were harmed en masse during World War One, and World War
Two was defined by Nazis indiscriminately targeting Russian and Eastern Europe civilians, in
addition to U.S. and allied forces firebombing innocents in Japan and razing Dresden to the ground.
Russia also committed widespread, brutal, and systematic rape against German women as a
reprisal for Nazi military actions.
The international community has not robustly responded to this shift in the composition
of conflict. The international community established the International Criminal Court (ICC) and

Karin Landgren, “Safety Zones and International Protection: A Dark Grey Area,” International Journal of
Refugee Law 7, no. 3 (September 1995): 437.
17
Ibid.
16
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has pursued a number of war tribunals to uphold the Geneva Conventions, which set out the
rights of individuals in wartime. These two moves attempted to prosecute war crimes in hopes of
shifting the nature of war back to a system less harmful to innocents in conflict zones.18
However, the effects of these two institutions have been minimal, as the ICC and war tribunals
have limited reach and power. As a result, the international community has chosen to respond to
these changes in warfare primarily by declaring humanitarian intervention a duty of the
international community and its organizations. In other words, the international community has
chosen to institutionalize addressing the symptom of the problem, not its cause.
Brendan Simms and D.J.B. Trim in Humanitarian Intervention: A History define
humanitarian intervention as, “action by governments (or, more rarely, by organizations) to
prevent or to stop governments, organizations, or factions, in a foreign state from violently
oppressing, persecuting, or otherwise abusing the human rights of people within that state.”19
This definition provides an understanding of the basic idea of humanitarian intervention, but it is
important to note that the individuals studying, defining, and discussing humanitarian
intervention span fields from ethics to war studies. They are additionally trying to explain a
phenomenon that can be occasionally difficult to separate from, “coercive diplomacy… armed
participation in foreign civil wars, revolts, revolutions, and insurgencies.”20 In defining,
discussing, and constraining humanitarian intervention, scholars and politicians alike have
struggled with the fact that humanitarian intervention necessarily abrogates national sovereignty
and picks sides within a conflict.

18

Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Examples (New York: Basic Books,
2015), 154.
19
Brendan Simms and D.J.B. Trim, Humanitarian Intervention: A History (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2011), 1.
20
Simms, Humanitarian Intervention, 2.
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As conflict-related humanitarian crises mounted in the 20th century, the international
community was faced with a growing need to create an international legal framework to justify
and control humanitarian intervention, and it tackled the obstacle of sovereignty first. The Treaty
of Westphalia marked the end of the Thirty Years’ War and ushered in an international shift from
feudal principalities to sovereign states, founding the notion of territorial sovereignty.21 This
concept is defined as, “the recognition by internal and external actors that the state has the
exclusive authority to intervene coercively in activities within its territory.”22 Seyom Brown, a
prominent scholar on the subject, argues that this unique shift not only led to the creation of
nation-states but additionally fostered a sense of ‘Westphalian principles’ within them.23 Brown
considers Westphalian principles to be the normative core of international law; namely, derived
from this notion of inviolable sovereignty, it is largely understood in the international community
that countries shall not interfere with each other’s domestic affairs.24
The international community hurdled this obstacle by creating international legal
justifications for abrogating the sovereignty of states at certain times. Plainly put, “The
perpetration of tyranny is not simply an obvious assault on the dignity of persons: it is a betrayal
of the very purpose for which the government exists.”25 A government surrenders its right to
sovereignty when it fails to fulfill, or chooses not to fulfill, its most basic responsibility of
protecting the citizens who live under it. After creating this legal argument to justify

Jason Farr, “The Westphalia Legacy and the Modern Nation-State,” International Social Science Review 80, no.
3/4 (2005): 156, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41887235.
22
Janice E. Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and
Empirical Research,” International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 2 (June 1995): 219,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2600847.pdf
23
Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalia Myth,” International Organization,
55, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 261, https://doi.org/10.1162/00208180151140577.
24
Ibid.
25
Fernando R. Téson, “The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and
Political Dilemmas, ed. J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 96.
21
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humanitarian intervention, the international community set about adopting a series of norms to
govern the actualization of it. In Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political
Dilemmas, Fernando Téson argues that humanitarian intervention is only legitimate when it
follows certain principles. Those principles include, “proportional… use… of military force,
undertaken in principle by a liberal government or alliance, aimed at ending tyranny or anarchy,
[and] welcomed by the victims.26”
However, the fact remained that the international community did not require
organizations or individual actors to intervene in humanitarian crises. Rather, it had created a
complex framework to justify intervention in the face of certain atrocities. Faced with an
increasing number of unaddressed humanitarian crises at odds with the robust international and
academic framework for humanitarian intervention, the UN created the doctrine of
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P was originally suggested in 2001 by the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), a commission populated mainly by
countries from the UN General Assembly.27 R2P declares that upholding the rights the
international community has granted to individuals constitutes a duty for international
organizations and independent actors.28 Essentially, the international community created R2P as
an attempt to institutionalize the requirement of intervention in qualifying humanitarian crises.
The UN made a concerted effort to increase intervention in the years following the
adoption of R2P, including the implementation of a peacekeeping mission in Darfur to address
the genocide.29 However, the UN did not respond to any number of other humanitarian crises (an

Téson, “Ethics,” 94.
Todd Burkhardt, Just War and Human Rights: Fighting with Right Intention (Albany, New York: State University
of New York Press, 2017), 87.
28
Burkhardt, Just War, 8.
29
“The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified June 12, 2013,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/dilemma-humanitarian-intervention.
26
27
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action commonly referred to as nonintervention) ranging from a devastating cyclone in Burma in
2008 to Desmond Tutu’s call for a nonmilitary intervention in Zimbabwe.30 R2P additionally
provided France with appropriate justification to become involved in conflicts in Mali, which, at
best, was problematic given France’s position as Mali’s former colonizer.31 Noting French
involvement in Mali is important because it shows how, not only was R2P not fully actualized,
but it even gave actors a cover to pursue advantageous policy options that may otherwise have
been viewed unfavorably by the international community.
Additionally, a number of UN interventions that were undertaken in good faith proved
less than successful.32 For example, in 2011, the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 1973 to address the deteriorating situation in Libya. The Resolution called for an
immediate ceasefire and permitted the use of ‘all means necessary’ to protect citizens.33 A
coalition led by NATO began a military intervention in mid-March that lasted until Gaddafi’s
death in October. Following the end of the fighting, the UN established the United Nations
Support Mission in Libya to help the transitional government, but reconstruction efforts have
proven largely unsuccessful. The UN-backed Government of National Accord is only one of the
many factions vying for control in the country. The situation has devolved into a conflict
between numerous armed groups and terrorist organizations, and there is no appreciable central
governmental authority in the nation. Despite UN attempts to broker agreements between groups,

Charles Homans, “Responsibility to Protect: A Short History,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/responsibility-to-protect-a-short-history/.
31
Peter Beaumont, “Yes, the UN has a duty to intervene. But when, where and how?” The Guardian, May 4, 2013,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/04/un-syria-duty-to-intervene.
32
Tom Esslemont, “As Syrian deaths mount, world’s ‘responsibility to protect’ takes a hit: experts,” Reuters,
October 24, 2016 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-law/as-syrian-deaths-mount-worldsresponsibility-to-protect-takes-a-hit-experts-idUSKCN12O2S3.
33
Richard Roth, “U.N. Security Council approves no-fly zone in Libya,” CNN, March 18, 2011,
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/03/17/libya.civil.war/index.html?hpt=T2.
30
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Libya is now widely regarded as a failed state.34 When faced with the understanding that
successfully installing and protecting the Government of the National Accord would require
huge amounts of sustained effort, the UN faded out of the picture. While R2P succeeded in
getting the UN to the table, it did not ultimately play a large role in helping the people of Libya
achieve peace. In the wake of this failure of R2P, the UN chose, and has continued to choose, to
remain largely on the sidelines in Syria. The main lesson learned from the application of R2P in
Libya was that, in order to play a substantive role in the resolution of a war, the UN needed to
commit much more than marginal involvement. If individual actors and international
organizations had previously not become involved in conflicts because they were unwilling to
expend the effort and resources to do so, R2P did little to address or mitigate those barriers. The
reasons international organizations and actors were not intervening to address human rights
abuses were not solved by R2P. Rather, nonintervention was due to practical factors that R2P did
not address.
These problems inherent to R2P made it clear that states and other actors do not
undertake humanitarian intervention lightly. Before R2P, there was a sense that the international
community had not tried hard enough to police humanitarian crises. However, waning
enthusiasm for R2P is tied to the growing international realization that humanitarian intervention
is difficult, an acknowledgment supported by its mixed track record. This international wariness
is seen in the reluctance of countries and organizations to intervene for humanitarian purposes in
Venezuela, Myanmar, and Syria, to pick three examples. However, little of this newfound
skepticism and reluctance has extended to safe zones. Safe zones are often viewed as separate

Zineb Abdessadok, “Libya Today: From Arab Spring to failed state,” Aljazeera, May 30, 2017,
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/happening-libya-today-170418083223563.html.
34
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from humanitarian intervention, and therefore not plagued by the systemic problems associated
with humanitarian intervention. However, the reality could not be more different. Safe zones are
a form of humanitarian intervention, not separate from it, and are tied up in the same
complexities and difficulties as other forms of humanitarian intervention. Namely, safe zones are
constrained by the same narrow international legal definition as humanitarian intervention, and
they are often implemented by actors who do not fully realize the effort and resources required to
undertake them successfully. It is ultimately illogical for the international community to be
reluctant to pursue humanitarian intervention and not also be reluctant to implement safe zones.
The reasons for these problems with humanitarian intervention can be explained on a
theoretical level by an argument put forth by Edward Luttwak in Strategy: The Logic of War and
Peace. While his argument is extensive, the main idea is that the systems of logic employed
during peacetime and during war are not only different but are complete inverses of each other.
For instance, “an advancing force can choose between two roads, one good and one bad, the first
broad, direct, and well-paved, the second narrow, circuitous, and unpaved. Only in the
paradoxical realm of strategy would the choice arise at all, because it is only in war that a bad
road can be good precisely because it is bad and may therefore be less strongly defended or even
left unguarded by the enemy.”35 He extrapolates this argument to discuss the paradoxical
problems of humanitarian intervention, a notion that sounds so positive and reasonable but is
rarely successful. Luttwak begins by noting that the largest motivation of an intervening body is
to avoid casualties to its own forces.36 This is logical; in a war zone, the main motivation is often
to simply survive. The disconnect with humanitarian intervention is that the practice is a self-

35

Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
2001), 3.
36
Luttwak, Strategy, 61.
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imposed war to protect a third party. The knee-jerk reaction of self-preservation made by a thirdparty soldier is to herself, and maybe her comrades. Her reaction to danger likely does not
accommodate protecting a group of individuals who are not her countrymen. An internal UN
review released in 2015 even, “found that UN peacekeeping missions routinely avoid using force
to protect civilians who are under attack, intervening in only 20 percent of cases despite being
authorized to do so by the UN Security Council.”37
Luttwak argues that, despite this deep disconnect between the third-party intervenor and
the group that needs protecting, the intervening force can pursue its own self-interest and still
have a positive effect on the situation. The inclination of UN a peacekeeping force (Luttwak’s
chosen example of an intervening actor) is generally to side with local belligerents, keeping the
peace (in a relative sense) and protecting itself. Luttwak says that, in this scenario of backing the
stronger local belligerent, “the result could be conducive to peace. For in that case, the UN
presence would actually enhance the peacemaking potential of war, by helping the strong to
defeat the weak that much faster and more decisively.”38
A discussion of the morality of Luttwak’s argument falls outside of the scope of this
paper, but the structure of his logic is applicable when considering the motivations of actors
pursuing humanitarian intervention. Luttwak’s suggestion sounds jarring, but it is logical; a
third-party cannot really be expected to put itself in harm’s way, but it can still play a role in
minimizing the amount of time spent in war, therefore minimizing casualties. The problems lie in
the fact that, while an intervening force wants to mitigate harm to itself, it is likely to be
unwilling to take the extreme measures Luttwak suggests. The UN wants to save lives while
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remaining a neutral force; it wants to protect the vulnerable population without putting its forces
in a dangerous position, but it also wants to stay away from strong belligerents, or at least not
actively support their goals. The main effect of this situation is that, “at best… forces remain the
passive spectators of violence and outright massacres.”39
Safe zones are areas of civility, so their creation and administration is often defined by
the linear logic of peace. However, safe zones are necessarily erected in areas of conflict where
the logic of war pervades. It is from this disconnect that major problems arise. Luttwak does note
that intervention can still be justified, even if the international community cannot stomach the
idea of supporting one side to quickly end a war, but only if the intervention tangibly protects
civilians, “from the effects of the wars they are prolonging.”40 Derived from Luttwak’s theory of
competing systems of logic, this chapter deconstructs the interests of actors intervening for
humanitarian purposes, and how the level of an actor’s interest informs its will and ability to
overcome challenges.
The reality of humanitarian intervention is that it is complex, costly, and difficult to
implement. Because of these large hurdles, countries and organizations tend to only intervene
when it serves them in some way. When discussing the case of nonintervention in Darfur, where
the UN estimated 300,000 people were killed,41 Nick Grono wrote, “the sad reality is that Darfur
simply does not matter enough, and Sudan matters too much for the international community to
do more to stop the atrocities.”42 An entity will not spend resources and time and risk a possible
negative outcome that could involve harm to its own forces if intervention does not somehow
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align with its interests as a nation or an organization. A. Krieg, in Motivations for Humanitarian
Intervention, explains this phenomenon as an, “assumption deriving from realism that states in
the international arena should and do base their actions on self-interest or, in a broader sense,
national interests.”43 This conception of self-interest does not inherently mean that a nation
cannot intervene in a positive way, or that the self-interest of one nation would not align with the
interests of a group within a conflict. However, the international legal structures for humanitarian
intervention have also created a system that allows for ‘power plays’ poorly disguised as
humanitarian intervention.44 Humanitarian intervention, including safe zones, allows a country to
intervene in the affairs of other nations and pursue goals, whether helpful or harmful, while
being protected by a system that justifies and vindicates its actions. Edward Luttwak described
this situation through the lens of UN intervention, as, “[satisfying] interventionist urges
mandated by member states, or even motivated by their own institutional ambitions.”45 The legal
and social structures that normalized humanitarian intervention in response to increasing civilian
death in war zones were predicated legitimately on the belief that, “states should not be able to
commit mass murder by hiding behind national sovereignty.” 46 This sentiment paradoxically
lays the foundation for an actor to abrogate the sovereignty of a nation to further its own goals. If
a country is entering a conflict for reasons of self-interest, the country is likely to greatly
complicate the conflict and skew toward actions fulfilling self-interest over legitimate
humanitarian actions.
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Additionally, rendering aid to a group may involve complex considerations of how best
to gather individuals, when some may be reluctant. In Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer
considers the three main reasons individuals would be reluctant to enter a zone of safety
established by a third party. He identifies these to be, “[a] hope to welcome the enemy and profit
from his victory, and from those who are unwilling to ‘desert’ the patriotic cause… [or] the
unwillingness to leave one’s home to separate from one’s friends and family, to become a
refugee.”47 This chapter suggests the additional motivation, particularly during humanitarian
crises, that some individuals would choose to flee the area or nation altogether, rather than enter
a safe zone within its borders. Creating a safe zone that includes all of the vulnerable individuals
belonging to a specific group would mean removing the agency of precisely those individuals
who wished to flee or wished to stay where they were. While Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention grants an actor the power to, “[if considered necessary] for reasons imperative to
security, [or] to take safety measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject
them to assigned residence or to internment.”48 Notably, the words ‘considered necessary’ are
problematic in this article as they are open to interpretation.
An uncharitable view of this problem, offered by Edward Luttwak, is that safe zones,
“inhibit the normal remedy of endangered citizens, which is to escape from the combat zone.”49
A stance that better balances Luttwak’s opposition and the possible positive aspects of
constraining unwilling populations is that, while removing agency from noncombatants leaves
them vulnerable to abuse, fleeing can also be highly dangerous. There may also be legitimate
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situations in which moving all individuals to one place allows an actor to more effectively
protect civilians and render aid.
The doctrine of double effect can be useful in considering situations where removing the
agency of individuals is justified. Double effect requires that “the act is good in itself or at least
indifferent; the direct effect is morally acceptable; the intention of the actor is good; and the good
effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the evil effect.”50 While this framework is
generally applied to the killing of noncombatants in war zones, the proposition of double effect is
a better framework than Article 78 for considering when the removal of agency from individuals
in war zones is justified.
Ultimately, even if the intentions of the actor are genuinely good, the actual process of
intervening can be problematic. The interests of an actor inform its willingness to overcome the
problems of intervention. The greater the interests of an actor in a given conflict, the larger its
will to overcome the challenges it will inevitably face in establishing a safe zone. Perhaps one of
the largest obstacles safe zones pose is that they cannot be implemented according to the
international legal standards of what constitutes legitimate humanitarian intervention. In
Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse argued that
legitimate humanitarian intervention must involve humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and
universality.51 Essentially, humanitarian intervention must seek to increase the welfare of human
beings, aim to relieve the suffering of individuals regardless of identity, aid individuals without
taking a side in the conflict, and support universal common values.52
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At the heart of their argument are the ideas of impartiality and neutrality. Woodhouse and
Ramsbotham described impartiality as “[making] no discrimination as to nationality, race,
religious beliefs, class, or political opinions,”53 and neutrality as, “not [taking] sides in hostilities
or [engaging] at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature.”54
These two notions sound similar but have important differences. Doctors Without Borders
explains impartiality as not discriminating based on the identity of an individual, meaning
rendering services to all individuals in conflict zones.55 Doctors Without Borders additionally
explains neutrality as not taking sides in a larger conflict.56 In this sense, impartiality can be
conceived of as a tenet on an individual level, and neutrality is a systemic notion. While these
ideals may sound reasonable, they stand in complete opposition to the reality of humanitarian
intervention. It is virtually impossible to intervene in a truly impartial and neutral manner.
Intervention in a humanitarian crisis inherently requires taking a side. Otherwise an intervention
would have no effect on the conflict and offer no reprieve from violence for civilians.
This situation is particularly clear with safe zones. An intervening actor has to enter a
conflict, create an area of safety protecting a certain group, and physically defend it. Karl von
Clausewitz famously defined the mechanism of war as: “each of the adversaries [forcing] the
hand of the other… [resulting in] a reciprocal action.”57 Invading a country and creating a safe
zone is forcing the belligerents’ hands; a reciprocal action should be expected. This is the seed of
many problems with safe zones. International organizations and other actors attempt to remain
neutral and impartial to avoid looking like they are having an effect on the larger conflict, but the
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fact of the matter is that they are, and they do. Luttwak described this phenomenon: “[The]
common, inherent characteristic is that [the intervenor inserts] themselves in war situations while
refusing to engage in combat.”58 While every intervening actor becomes involved in a
humanitarian crisis because it has some interest in the conflict, an actor is very unlikely to have
levels of interest that justify risking the lives of its service members for a third-party. In order for
the interests of an actor to create a willingness to accept the possible imperilment of its forces, its
interests likely have to be related to national security interest or some form of vital economic
interest. A third-party humanitarian disaster would have to be very specific to fulfill those
requirements, and very rarely are those requirements evident in a conflict where an actor is
undertaking humanitarian intervention. Therefore, the actors generally intervening in
humanitarian crises do not have adequate interests in the situation to create the willingness to
overcome the practical challenge of danger. It is from this disconnect that many of the problems
and shortcomings of safe zones as a tool of humanitarian intervention arise.
There are additional practical considerations. While the interest of an actor informs its
will to overcome some of these practical considerations, there is another step between
willingness and execution. Great enough interests create willingness to overcome practical
challenges, but the actor must have the ability to do so. If the will of an actor is commensurate
with the effort needed to overcome the practical challenges of safe zone implementation, and it
has the military, political, and economic ability to do so, then the operation can be successful.
However, these practical challenges can be great, and even an actor with large enough interests
and a high level of willingness may still lack the ability in material or political terms to
overcome these practical challenges. Conor Foley, author of The Thin Blue Line: How
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Humanitarianism Went to War, said in an interview that, “humanitarian interventions virtually
never resolve humanitarian crises… and the attempt to portray humanitarian interventions as a
panacea is damaging because it is just not true that they work. Over the last twenty years, there
are very few that have worked.”59
Foley argues that humanitarian intervention can only be successful under narrow
circumstances, namely when an intervention is, “supported by the U.N. Security Council…
properly financed, [has] proper goals, and those where interveners understand their mandate.”60
The common denominator of these factors is a high level of resources, organization, and clarity.
These factors can only be fulfilled by a deeply committed actor with an array of resources
including, but not limited to, funds, armaments, and personnel. Furthermore, even in situations
where the intervening actor is fully aware of these considerations and willing to fund an
intervention, it may be materially unable to overcome some of the practical challenges of the
project. How can an actor protect a group that is far away, or dispersed across a wide terrain?
How can an actor protect a group in difficult terrain? If one group is being protected from
another, how can the actor distinguish between the groups? When does an actor intervene? How
does an actor coordinate between agencies and groups? How does an actor gauge the levels of
weaponry needed for a specific context? Does the actor need air power as well as ground troops?
Where does the actor put the safe zone? Should the location be easily accessible for individuals
fleeing the conflict, or somewhere more strategically located for defensive purposes, should the
need arise? How can an actor ensure stability in the area after it leaves? The questions governing
these practical aspects continue on and on. They are all questions that can be answered and
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planned for in most scenarios given proper time, resources, and manpower. The reality remains
whether or not countries and organizations can ever have adequate interests to create a level of
willingness which, coupled with the material resources of the actor, can overcome these hurdles
and have a chance at proving successful.
If the interests of an actor are not large enough to create an appropriate level of will, there
is a moral hazard problem with intervention. The current system of humanitarian intervention
creates a moral hazard for the international community. Intervening in conflicts removes the
need for the international community to pursue, implement, and oversee peace plans or military
actions that actually address the conflict. Instead of undertaking that difficult work, international
organizations and individual actors have a built-in ‘easy way out’ option. They can pursue
humanitarian intervention to ‘address’ the problem, or at least appear to be addressing the
problem to the international community. While humanitarian intervention does not create a
moral hazard for actors in a vacuum, it does more often than not in the reality of the international
system. As established above, the likelihood that any given actor has interests large enough to
make it willing to utilize the full power of its political and military ability for intervention is very
low. The system is such, however, that actors are not mandated or even necessarily expected to
fulfill those basic requirements before intervening in a conflict. Therefore, an actor has an
incentive to intervene half-heartedly in a conflict rather than pursue an arduous diplomatic
process or a bald military intervention.

Additionally, Luttwak explains that “war may be a

great evil, but it does have great virtue. By consuming and destroying the material and moral
resources needed to keep fighting, war prevents its own continuation.”61 Essentially, only a war
that has ended after burning out the resources needed to wage war can lead to a sustainable
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peace.62 He goes on to argue that, “Since 1945, wars among lesser powers have rarely been
allowed to follow their natural course. Instead, they have typically been interrupted.”63 The
interruptions of humanitarian intervention prolong the conflict and allow the belligerent pockets
of time without fighting when it can regroup, reposition, and retrain.64 Intervening for
humanitarian purposes without having appropriate interest, willingness, and ability creates a
dangerous situation for the group in need of protection. Despite this fact, the international
community upholds a system where half-cocked humanitarian intervention fills the same
ceremonial role of ‘involvement’ that undertaking actual, tangible steps toward solving the
conflict would. Ultimately, safe zones and humanitarian intervention are mired in extensive
obstacles. While the international community has begun to slowly recognize this in relation to
humanitarian intervention, the same hesitance has not yet been extended to safe zones.
This thesis will analyze the case studies through the lens of the interests of the actors.
Once the interest of each actor is established, this analysis will consider how that interest informs
the willingness of the actor to overcome the practical challenges safe zones posed in each case
study. The chapter will then discuss how the interests and willingness of the actor informed its
ability to undertake the project. Ultimately, the analysis will consider how moral hazard played a
role in each scenario, and how a consideration of interest, will, ability, and moral hazard for each
case study informs the success or failure of the safe zone.
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Case Study: Srebrenica
History
Srebrenica is a small town in Bosnia and Herzegovina; despite its small population, lack
of industry, and mountainous terrain, the city was the location of the largest act of genocide to
occur on European soil since the end of WWII. In the summer of 1995, the Bosnian Serb army
murdered roughly 8,000 Muslim Bosnians in a UN safe zone under the protection of a battalion
of Dutch peacekeepers working in concert with NATO air forces.65
The historical context for the genocide at Srebrenica is complex; the conflict in Bosnia
was a subset of a convoluted civil war in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was originally established
after World War One by merging areas of the former Austro-Hungarian empire with the
Kingdom of Serbia, resulting in an ethnically and religiously diverse nation.66 Following World
War Two, Yugoslavia formed a communist government led by Josip Tito. The country was
comprised of six territories: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia
(which also included two independent territories, Kosovo and Vojvodina), and Slovenia.
Yugoslavia’s ethnic groups included, but were not limited to, Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins,
Slovenes, Macedonians, and Slavic Muslims.67 Yugoslavia was comprised of six administrative
units; each territory represented the strongest concentration of each ethnicity. Serbs lived
predominantly in Serbia, Croats lived predominantly in Croatia, and so on. The exception to this
was Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had fairly equal populations of Eastern Orthodox Serbs,
Muslim Slavs (commonly referred to as Bosniaks), and a large minority of Catholic Croats. It is
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important to note that no single ethnic group comprised a majority in Bosnia.68

Tito’s death in 1980 marked the end of a rule that had suppressed ethnic tensions through
promoting brotherhood and unity and oppressing dissent. Tito’s death was followed by an
economic crisis and the beginning of the fall of communism.69 These changes led to an increase
in ethnic nationalism across the territories, coinciding with the 1986 appointment of Slobodan
Milošević as the head of the ruling communist party in Serbia.70 Milošević and his supporters
overthrew state governments in Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina, and Kosovo, instating leaders
who aligned with their ideals. He began calling for the unity and centralization of Yugoslavia
under a mainly Serb government, which was opposed by Slovenia, Macedonia, and Croatia, who
wished for the territories and their predominant ethnic groups to gain greater independence.71
Croatia eventually declared independence from Yugoslavia, and this move increased tensions
with Serbia because Croatia had a large minority of Serbs.72 Slovenia then declared
independence, and with violence between Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia mounting, the
international community tried and failed to reach a peace deal. The conflict became centered
around that fact that Milošević had become the de facto leader of Yugoslavia, and the other
ethnic groups in their respective territories wished to leave Yugoslavia and its Serb-dominated
rule. Milošević opposed the disintegration of Yugoslavia by supporting rebelling Serb minorities
in other territories.
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This ethnic violence eventually spread to Bosnia. Bosnians, primarily Bosniaks, voted for
independence in a referendum denounced by Bosnian Serb leaders and boycotted by most
Bosnian Serbs.73 Following this vote, Serbs in Bosnia declared their own independent republic,
and Milošević sent Serbs from the Yugoslav Army to serve in the Bosnian Serb army.74 The
army began seizing Serb-majority areas within Bosnia and launching mortar attacks on Sarajevo,
the Bosnian capital. The international community started closely monitoring the situation in
Bosnia, in addition to the larger conflict in Yugoslavia. The UN established a peacekeeping force
in Bosnia in February of 1992. In the early days, the UN tasked this peacekeeping force,
UNPROFOR, with stabilizing Sarajevo, namely through protecting the functions of its airport.75
Two months later in April, the Serbs began a campaign of ethnic cleansing against Bosniaks in
north and east Bosnia. In August, the UN discovered the existence of a Serb-run concentration
camp in Omarska.76 In September of 1992, the UN envoy to Bosnia reported to the UN Human
Rights Commission that Serbs were responsible for most of the crimes in Bosnia, and the UN
expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR to include protecting humanitarian relief convoys.
Violence further increased in the following year as Serb forces dominated the Bosniak
army, and in May of 1993, the Security Council was faced with the inevitable fall of a Bosniak
stronghold at Srebrenica. In Humanitarian Intervention and Safety Zones: Iraq, Bosnia, and
Rwanda, Carol McQueen described the situation as, “the town was entirely surrounded and
under siege with Serbs blocking access to the humanitarian convoys aiming to deliver food to its
now swollen population of 60,000.”77 General Philippe Morillon, the commander of
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UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia, went to Srebrenica without the permission of his superiors; once
there, he hoisted a UN flag and announced that Srebrenica was under the protection of the United
Nations.78 Morillon thought his words would be a temporary promise to the civilians in
Srebrenica, believing that a peace plan would soon be reached. Mounting pressure on Srebrenica
by Bosnian Serbs, however, forced the Security Council’s hand. Resolution 819, passed the
Security Council in May 1993, officially established Srebrenica as a safe zone.79 The
UNPROFOR peacekeepers tasked with protecting Srebrenica were from a battalion of Dutch
soldiers often referred to as Dutchbat.
Over the following months, the UN executed a plan to establish Srebrenica as a safe
zone. According to the resolution, Srebrenica and its surrounding area were to be, “free from any
armed attack or any other hostile attack,” and while this objective was clear, UNPROFOR’s
expanded mandate was not.80 Peacekeepers and their commanders were unsure if their job was
only to deter Serb forces, or, as the mandate also suggested, to, “[act] in self-defense, to take the
necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against safe areas.”81
Responding to the bombardment of the safe area and deterring the Serb force were not
necessarily complementary actions; the former made UNPROFOR wary of escalating the
conflict. Additionally, UNPROFOR superiors maintained that “the execution of the mandate was
secondary to the security of UN personnel,” giving Dutchbat soldiers a catch-all excuse for
selectively executing their convoluted and contradictory mandate.82 The mandate also authorized
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the use of, “air power in and around the safe areas,” which, in the case of UNPROFOR, meant
NATO air assistance.83
In late spring of the same year, France delivered a report to the Security Council which
suggested two options that would, “suffice to cover — sanctuarize— the areas.”84 In order to
protect the tens of thousands of Bosniaks who had taken shelter from the Bosnian Serb army at
Srebrenica, the UN needed to undertake serious measures. The light option suggested by the
French involved 10,000 soldiers. 85 The heavy option, the only one the French report found likely
to “oppose aggression” against the UN safe area, called for 45,000 troops.86 The suggested
criteria for the involvement of airpower in all of these cases was in response to, “shelling of the
safe areas, armed incursion into the safe areas, and impeding the free movement of
UNPROFOR.”87 However, even as years passed after this 1993 proclamation, the suggestions
remained unimplemented. McQueen boils the reason for this inaction down to the fact that “there
never was any intention to defend the safe areas through deployment of ground troops.”88
Srebrenica was additionally, “difficult to defend. Although the terrain was extremely
hilly and densely forested, the enclave itself was relatively small… [it was] located in [a] valley
that could be overlooked from the surrounding hills… in direct view of Serb artillery
positions.”89 Dutchbat had two bases and thirteen observation posts (OPs) protecting a fiftykilometer perimeter in Srebrenica and its neighboring town of Potočari.90 However, by 1995, the
year the massacre at Srebrenica would take place, Dutchbat only had 429 men, and only half of
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them were infantry soldiers.91 The issue of who exactly was being protected in the enclave
compounded this problem with troop numbers. While the safe zone was intended only for
civilian Bosniaks fleeing the Serb advance, “there were thousands of armed Muslims based in
the safe area.”92
The situation was growing increasingly tenuous for Dutchbat as, “the ceasefire was
regularly violated by both sides, and shipments of humanitarian supplies… were habitually
obstructed by the Serbs. Given the inconsistent mandate and limited strength, the Dutch felt they
could... do little more than watch, count, log, and report violations.”93 The final Serb attack on
Srebrenica began on July 6, 1995. The Serbs shelled vulnerable OPs, most of which were
positioned in the valley for the sole purpose of observation and were poorly located for tactical
conflict.94 The Commander of Dutchbat, Lieutenant Colonel Karremans, was tasked with
choosing between three available options: returning Serb fire in an act of self-defense warranted
by UNPROFOR’s mandate, which would risk retaliation from the superiorly manned Serb
forces; requesting air support from NATO with the possibility that such actions would greatly
escalate the conflict; and pursuing a de-escalation of the situation through diplomacy.95
Karremans opted for diplomacy, though repeated attempts to reach out to the Serb forces were
unsuccessful.
Conditions deteriorated further over the following days. The Serb army continued
provocative attacks around Srebrenica. Lieutenant-General Janvier, acting UNPROFOR
commander in Bosnia, refused several requests for air support, believing that the Serb forces
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were not serious about taking the enclave. 96 He additionally feared that mounting an air attack
would only escalate the conflict.97 Dutchbat forces on the ground were outgunned and
outmanned by the Serb forces, and additionally, “believed that they could not be expected to put
up any meaningful defense of the enclave.”98 Even if Karremans could convince Janvier to
secure close air support from NATO, such an attack could trigger the use of artillery and mortars
by the Serb forces, endangering Dutchbat and Srebrenica unless all or most Serb weapon systems
could be eliminated in the air raid.99
The Serb army continued to capture vulnerable OPs, and additionally took a number of
Dutchbat soldiers hostage.100 On the day of July 11, 1995, it became undeniable that the Serb
objective was to capture Srebrenica, and that Dutchbat was simultaneously incapable of
mounting an effective counterattack and also largely unwilling to do so. UN officials and NATO
entities eventually approved calls from Dutchbat requesting airstrikes on roughly forty targets.101
However, after only a number of the forty targets were destroyed, the Serb army issued a return
ultimatum that, “if the air attacks were not stopped forthwith, they would kill captured Dutch
soldiers and shell the refugees and Dutchbat indiscriminately.”102 The Dutch defense minister
called for an immediate stop to the bombardment. That afternoon, when Karremans began
negotiations with the Serbs, there were roughly 25,000 Bosniaks in and around the Dutch
compounds.103
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Though ‘negotiations’ lasted a number of days, and Dutchbat did not leave Srebrenica
until July 21st, the Serb army faced few barriers in executing their plan of ethnic cleansing. The
Serbs had begun quietly deporting Bosniaks almost immediately after Srebrenica fell. The UN
and the Dutch government reached an agreement with the Serb army that Dutchbat should
‘monitor the evacuation of the refugees,’ which, in practice, meant that Dutch soldiers were to
help separate the women and children from the men.104 At that point, any option to also save the
Bosniaks was lost. The compound had already been overrun.
The Serbs murdered the Bosniak men and boys; in all, roughly 8,000 Bosniaks were
killed in a blatant act of genocide at Srebrenica.105 Years later at the Hague, Fouad Riad, a judge
on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia said, “These are truly scenes
from hell, written on the darkest pages of human history.”106

Analysis
The tragedy at Srebrenica was, at every point until the end, completely avoidable. The
negligent decisions of the international community, particularly the members of the Security
Council and the Dutch government, allowed the massacre to occur. After years of watching the
chaos in Yugoslavia unfold as widespread ethnic violence took root in Bosnia, the international
community entered the conflict slowly and without much of a plan. The establishment of
UNPROFOR itself is a testament to this; it was originally tasked with protecting a single airport
in a region plagued by conflict. The UN did not have much of an interest in the conflict outside
of a genuine concern for the loss of human life.
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It was only after the international community became aware of the severity of the
genocide and the Serb concentration camps, hearkening back to images of the Holocaust, that
international pressure forced the UN to act in earnest. The UN intended to restrict its actions
solely to supplying increased humanitarian aid; the notion of establishing the safe zone at
Srebrenica was not planned, rather it was the culmination of mounting ethnic violence and
Morillon’s rogue proclamation to the civilians who had fled to the valley. McQueen explains that
“designating Srebrenica a safe area was an ad hoc response to a crisis: community interests
dictated that something be done, and state interests enabled acceptance, albeit hesitant, of the
policy, perhaps explaining why no clear enforcement measures were considered at the time
[Resolution] 819 was adopted.”107 When faced with massive human loss and genocide, the UN
made a knee jerk decision to implement safe zones because, on the face of it, the action
addressed the crisis. The UN did not decide to institute a safe zone because of increased interest,
or a serious consideration of its willingness to increase military and financial exposure in the
conflict. The problems began to arise, as noted by McQueen, with the implementation of the
policy.
It was, at all points, clear what needed to be done to protect the safe zone. That should
not be equivocated. It is clear from the French suggestions to the Security Council directly
following the passage of Resolution 819 that the military requirements of the undertaking were
understood. All of the actors involved understood that a large number of highly armed soldiers
with air support was needed to ensure the protection and stability of Srebrenica as a safe area.
The disconnect between the establishment of the safe area and the implementation of the steps
required to protect it can be boiled down to the interests, or lack thereof, of the UN.
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It is important to note again that the soldiers protecting the outpost were Dutch. Luttwak
argues that, in multinational military scenarios, even, “the best-trained and best-paid forces of the
most ambitious armies… avoid risk at all costs,” to minimize casualties or avoid them entirely.
The Dutch had no reason to sacrifice their soldiers to protect Bosniaks. The UN was aware of
this dynamic and wrote the mandate accordingly. Dutchbat was not required by its mandate to
protect the safe area if doing so put peacekeepers at risk. Additionally, the Dutch defense
minister, a man with no involvement in the UN or UNPROFOR, was the individual who ordered
the UN’s capitulation to the Serbs. The minister was naturally most loyal to the five hundred
Dutchbat soldiers at Srebrenica; he valued their survival over the survival of the men and boys in
the enclave. This observation should not serve as a moral indictment of the Dutchbat soldiers or
the Dutch defense minister, as those lines of thought fall outside of the scope of this argument.
This observation, however, is valuable to note in considering the interests and willingness of the
actors in this tragedy. The troops generally involved in UN interventions are not native to the
place of the conflict, which complicates their incentives and desires, and thus increases the
precariousness of the situation for the protected group.
Dutchbat soldiers, in addition to being more committed to their own survival than to
protecting the safe area, were also poorly equipped. In tactical terms, the safe area at Srebrenica
was disastrous. Honig and Both write that “the Dutch were outnumbered, surrounded, and the
city was indefensible.”108 When, in the final days of the Serb attack, UNPROFOR issued an
order for Dutchbat to employ, “every possible measure… to reinforce these positions, including
measures related to weapons,” Dutchbat simply could not fulfill the task.109 Asking 500 men to
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defend a group of foreign civilians when they are greatly outnumbered and lack adequate
military resources is absurd.
The UN’s low willingness to properly implement the safe zone at Srebrenica is clear in
the number of Dutch soldiers sent, and the armaments with which they were supplied. The UN’s
lack of proper action regarding the military French suggestions could perhaps be forgiven if the
UN had more quickly realized the danger of the situation and responded appropriately. The UN,
however, did not. It chose, at various points, to not use NATO close air support to aid the
outnumbered Dutchbat forces. At numerous junctures in the existence of Srebrenica as a safe
area, and certainly in the earlier days of the final Serb offensive, air support could have been
used to defend the safe area. UN and UNPROFOR officials simply waited too long to implement
it; when they finally fell back on their NATO allies in the final days of the conflict at Srebrenica,
the Serb army had already taken Dutch hostages. While Janvier’s and UNPROFOR’s main worry
regarding the use of air support was escalating the conflict, the judgment call was a bad one on
two counts. First, there was no legitimate alternative to the use of close air support, as Dutchbat
was clearly incapable of mounting a defense of the safe area. Second, there was no reason to
believe that the Serb attack was not a legitimate attempt to take the safe area. Janvier’s and
UNPROFOR’s refusal to use NATO close air support reflected their lack of willingness to be
involved in the conflict. At this critical juncture, Janvier and UNPROFOR made a decision that
aligned with their interests and willingness over the safety of the Bosniaks and the proper
execution of the safe zone.
McQueen suggests that “states underestimated, perhaps willfully, the extent to which it
would be difficult to implement an effective safe area policy: they seemed to be under the
illusion that if the Security Council proclaimed the existence of safe areas, local belligerents
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would take them seriously.”110 Her words effectively explain the series of events that led to the
downfall of Srebrenica. The entire enterprise at Srebrenica was based on the belief that merely
saying the outpost was a UN-protected safe area would make it one. However, this was
completely at odds with the reality of the situation as observed by the French and noted to the
Security Council as early as 1993. Even as Serbs repeatedly shelled the compound, Janvier
feared that “larger-scale air strikes… would risk drawing UNPROFOR into an all-out war with
the Serbs.”111 In reality, the UN had been involved in a war with the Serbs since the
establishment of the safe area in 1993, or, at the very least, since the beginning of the Serb
offensive roughly a week before the enclave fell. After the severity of the situation became clear
during the final Serb assault, Sergeant Batalona, who worked in the operations room at
Srebrenica as part of the UNPROFOR mission, said that “everybody got a fright. You could
easily get killed… as far as I knew, we had not been sent to Srebrenica to defend the enclave, but
rather as some kind of spruced-up observers.”112
It is ultimately important to look at the disaster of Srebrenica as a failure of the most
basic objective of humanitarian intervention and safe areas. It is clear that the safe area did not
protect the individuals it claimed that it could keep secure. State and international organizations
undertake humanitarian intervention to restore rights to civilians in conflict zones when war has
taken the rights away. In the case of the safe area at Srebrenica, the Serbs were committing
genocide against the Bosniaks; these acts spanned murder, rape, and forced detention. The safe
area was meant to be a physical space where individuals could shelter and have basic access to
vital resources like food, water, and medical care. In creating the safe zone, the UN guaranteed
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these rights to the people who sought refuge there. Because of this guarantee, persecuted
individuals came to Srebrenica specifically. Had there not been a guarantee of safety, individuals
would have behaved differently. As Luttwak suggested, many individuals likely would have fled
as far as they could. They certainly would not have congregated by the tens of thousands in a
deep valley in the center of Bosnia with no avenues for easy escape. The disaster at Srebrenica
was massive because the UN had gathered large numbers of Bosniaks in one place.
The actual act of gathering, in this case, is not problematic in a vacuum. The UN offered
protection in this area and people freely elected to seek that protection. The promise that the UN
made is also not, in a vacuum, problematic. The UN declared to Bosniaks, to Serbs, and to the
entire world, that Bosniaks fleeing the genocide would be safe at Srebrenica, guarded by the
auspices of the United Nations. What is deeply problematic, and what is at the crux of the
horrifying events that happened in Srebrenica, is the UN’s lack of preparedness to keep its
promise. While there could be extenuating factors− perhaps the UN probably did not realize at
the outset that keeping its promise would require a large-scale military operation− it became
clear quickly that such action was required to adequately protect the enclave. In the face of this
clarity, with the UN in possession of this objective truth, the organization chose not to pursue the
actions that would protect the safe zone. These actions could have included increasing troops on
the ground or using NATO close air support. Additionally, the UN underestimated the challenges
of the safe zone itself; it allowed armed Bosniaks to take shelter within the safe zone’s borders,
which both invalidated UNPROFOR’s mandate of impartiality and neutrality and likely further
incentivized the Serb attack on the enclave. The UN’s ambivalence regarding the armed
Bosniaks within the safe further supports the argument that the UN lacked the interest and will to
properly implement the safe zone. The UN could have stopped the armed Bosniaks from entering
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the safe area, or retroactively addressed their presence in the enclave. This situation additionally
reveals the complexities of creating a safe space for a targeted population. It is very difficult to
distinguish between groups in a conflict, and more so to distinguish civilians from guerilla
fighters. Creating a safe area without accidentally harboring the wrong group or harboring
military forces requires large amounts of effort and attention to detail. The UN undertaking at
Srebrenica lacked those aspects externally in relation to the larger conflict with the Serbs, and
also internally in the governance of the safe area.
Ultimately, the safe area at Srebrenica created an avenue for the international community
to ‘address the situation’ in Bosnia without actually addressing the root causes of the conflict.
Because the UN had little interest in the conflict, the idea of creating a safe zone presented a
moral hazard. The UN could silence international calls for action through implementing a safe
zone, an option it believed to require less effort and involvement than other forms of
intervention. By implementing peacekeeping forces and creating an international coalition
through NATO to provide air support, the UN could show that it was trying to help the situation.
In reality, when faced with the remarkable complexity of the conflict, humanitarian intervention
provided an alternative to becoming militarily or diplomatically involved. When looking at the
physical devastation of the wars and the images of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, the UN felt
pressured by the international community to take action. Humanitarian intervention allowed the
UN to do so, fulfilling its essentially symbolic duty with as little commitment as possible.
Humanitarian intervention and the use of safe zones creates a moral hazard for the
international community accordingly. When an actor does not have interests that inform a level
of willingness commensurate with practical challenges, and the actor intervenes in a crisis
anyway, moral hazard plays a role. The actor feels pressure to address the conflict, but its low
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levels of interest motivate it to choose the easiest option. Only, it is a misconception that
humanitarian intervention and safe zones are an easier way out than other diplomatic or military
solutions. As demonstrated, humanitarian intervention is difficult to successfully undertake and
requires large amounts of effort, commitment, and funding. With the safe zone at Srebrenica, the
UN was attempting to put a band-aid on the gushing wound of the war in Yugoslavia. Instead of
taking on the labor-intensive task of treating the injury with a method such as peace talks, the
UN chose what it believed to be the least consuming option. Ultimately, not only did the safe
zone not address the larger conflict in Bosnia or Yugoslavia, but because the UN was not
prepared to surmount the challenges of the safe zone, thousands of innocent lives were lost. This
line of analysis is important because the continued popularity of safe areas allows actors in the
international community an avenue to symbolically address crises. Not only does choosing this
avenue keep actors from actually addressing crises and helping the individuals experiencing
them, but, if safe zones are this chosen avenue of avoiding obligation, the likelihood of
increasing harm, rather than mitigating it, is high.
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Case Study: Operation Provide Comfort, Iraqi Kurdistan
History
Operation Provide Comfort was a humanitarian aid mission to provide resources and
areas of safety for Kurds in northern Iraq. It was undertaken by the same multinational coalition,
helmed by the United States, that executed military operations during Operation Desert Storm.
The conflict between the Kurds and the Iraqi government that ultimately forced many Kurds to
flee was primarily rooted in the history of the region− namely how European powers and the
United States divided the area of Kurdistan and its roughly thirty million Kurdish residents
following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.113 Kurds, an ethnic group tracing back to
indigenous groups on the plains of Mesopotamia, are racially and ethnically distinct from
Arabs.114 The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims, though some Kurds subscribe to other
religious practices.115 Following World War One, Kurdistan was divided into modern-day
Turkey, Syria, Iran, Armenia, and Iraq. Kurds now live predominantly in south-eastern Turkey,
north-eastern Syria, northern Iraq, north-western Iran, and south-western Armenia.116 Though
they are the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East, their statelessness and distinct identity
have led to serious discrimination. This discrimination and hatred runs so deep that Turkey has
even conducted a bombing campaign against Syrian Kurds despite the fact that Syrian Kurds are
fighting against Assad’s forces in concert with the Turkish army.117 Sustained and violent
othering of Kurds across the Middle East has aided the creation of an independent Kurdish
identity bolstered by powerful Kurdish military units and political groups.
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The case of Iraqi Kurdistan, the Kurdish territory in northern Iraq, is unique. Today, Iraqi
Kurdistan is an autonomous, largely self-governed region with consulates separate from Iraq’s in
nations across the globe.118 Its capital is Erbil and its roughly eight million citizens are governed
by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).119 Iraqi Kurdistan is more prosperous than Iraq
in a variety of ways: the KRG oversees better school systems, decent access to medical care,
secure oil fields, and comparatively high levels of foreign investment.120 Not only does Iraqi
Kurdistan have a generally higher quality of life than Iraq, but that quality of life has been
maintained over the past half-decade as Iraqi forces battled ISIS. The power of Iraqi Kurdistan’s
army, the Peshmerga, proved to be a successful deterrent to ISIS’s aggression. The terrorist
group left Kurdish territory mostly alone, and the Peshmerga even seized the opportunity to take
more Iraqi land in the chaos of the fight against ISIS.121 In 2017, an independence referendum in
Iraqi Kurdistan received an overwhelming majority of votes, leading to a declaration of
independence by Masoud Barzani, the leader of the KRG. Though the central Iraqi government
opposed this bid for independence and it eventually failed, its original success makes it clear that
Iraqi Kurdistan is a powerful player in Iraq and the Middle East. The power of this Kurdish
faction stirs questions of the possibility of eventual independence, or even the creation of a full
Kurdish state as the Iraqi, Turkish, and Syrian governments continue to fray.122
The rise of Iraqi Kurdistan was a direct result of Operation Provide Comfort. Before
international intervention in the early 1990s, the Kurdish situation in Iraq was bleak. In 1970,
Saddam Hussein, then Vice President of Iraq, reached an agreement with the Kurds to end a
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revolt in the north. While the agreement gave Kurds increased autonomy, Hussein began a
sustained campaign against them in the following years.123 In the early 1980s, the U.S. began
selling Iraq items to make chemical weapons with the intention of arming Iraq against Iran,
though the operation also supplied Hussein with the means to use chemical weapons against Iraqi
Kurdish resistance fighters.124 Following a 1988 incident where Hussein killed 5,000 Kurds with
these U.S.-supplied chemical weapons, America deemed its alliance with Iraq in the conflict
against Iran too important to change its policies. Ultimately, “the United States did not even
impose sanctions,” against Iraq, or stop supplying these materials.125
In 1991, after Operation Desert Storm and the U.S. victory in Kuwait, the Kurds revolted
again. It was likely their best opportunity to do so; the Iraqi army had been weakened by the
brief war, Shiites in southern Iraq were also fighting back against the beleaguered government
forces, and the U.S. had encouraged Iraqis to rise up against the Hussein regime during the Gulf
War.126 However, the Kurdish and Shiite forces were not able to make much headway, even
against the weakened Iraqi government forces. The Kurds were plainly outmatched by Iraqi
helicopters and heavy weaponry. The U.S. wavered on whether or not to intervene; on one hand,
the U.S. had encouraged the revolt, had previously ignored the plight of the Kurds and had
occasionally relied on Iraqi Kurds as allies in the region, but on the other hand, Americans did
not want to become involved in a complicated Iraqi civil war.127 As the U.S. wavered on
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intervention, roughly two million Kurds fled Iraq, heading north into Iraq’s mountainous border
region with Turkey. Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown commented that “for [the Kurds], to
flee provided the only hope for survival.”128 As the number of refugees mounted, the Turkish
government shut its borders, fearing that an influx of Kurds would stoke minority sentiment in
their own country, in addition to creating a significant financial burden.129 The result was
millions of Kurds stranded in the frigid mountains of northern Iraq, fearing a return home, but
left largely without options. During this period of limbo, many Kurds died from exposure and
malnutrition.130
The United States faced a serious humanitarian crisis for which it felt partly responsible.
McQueen argues that the eventual intervention was due in part to, “pressure on states to adhere
to the values that they themselves had espoused.”131 Additionally, the ‘CNN effect’ on American
citizens began to popularize the idea of intervention, as television news played heartbreaking
segments on the plight of the Kurds in the Karakoram. U.S. officials also feared looking weak by
not responding to a brutal rebellion in the country the U.S. had just defeated.132 The UN Security
Council, “adopted Resolution 688... condemning the repression of the Iraqi civilian population…
and insisting that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations,” on
April 5, 1991.133 A few weeks later, on April 16th, President Bush declared an Air Force
operation to supply the Kurds with blankets, food, and other humanitarian supplies, beginning
Operation Provide Comfort.134 The first stage of the plan was to provide emergency relief, and
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the second was to provide sustained humanitarian aid with the help of fellow Joint Task Force
(JTF) members England, Germany, France, and Italy. The JTF was notably comprised of
members of Desert Storm’s multinational coalition.
Operation Provide Comfort first had to find the refugees; they were scattered across wide
swaths of remote, inhospitable terrain. The task force identified twelve major camps in the
mountainous region, each full of tens of thousands of individuals in desperate need of food,
clothing, and medical supplies. Sections of the JTF went to work providing assistance to these
camps, while other forces encouraged Kurds to move to the mountain camps, so they could have
access to the resources there. This process, referred to as ‘temporary resettlement,’ was
undertaken to facilitate the provision of aid and security to the Kurds.135
Executing the second part of the plan, creating a system to provide sustained
humanitarian aid, involved, “[moving] the Kurds from the mountain camps and [resettling] them
in northern Iraq… General Garner’s JTF Bravo, formed with conventional forces… entered Iraq
and created a security zone.”136 In the process of moving refugees from the mountain camps to
the newly constructed camps in a security area in northern Iraq, it became clear that many
wished to simply return home, “regardless of the condition.”137 About a third of the refugees
were from the nearby northern Iraq town of Duhok, which was under Iraqi control. The JTF
eventually mounted an operation and took Duhok back. Following the fight, the JTF rebuilt key
infrastructure in the city to ensure that it could receive and sustain the refugees.138 The security
area eventually became a 10,000 square kilometer area of northern Iraq, protected by JTF
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airpower’s maintenance of a no-fly zone above the country’s 36th parallel.139 It is also valuable
to note that the Peshmerga worked in concert with JTF forces. Gordon Rudd writes that “[the
JTF] developed a cooperative relationship with [the Peshmerga], making use of their
capabilities.”140 While the Peshmerga had not been strong enough to beat the Iraqi army outright,
the Peshmerga helped bolster JTF forces. More importantly, the force ensured that a military
presence continued to exist in northern Iraq following the withdrawal of JTF forces.
Once the refugees were resettled in the security area, the JTF began the process of
leaving Iraq, handing over humanitarian efforts to the UNHCR and NGOs.141 While these
agencies were capable of taking over the relief aspects of Operation Provide Comfort, the UN
initially refused to provide peacekeeping forces to maintain the security of northern Iraq. 142 The
UN eventually reached a diplomatic agreement with the Iraqi government that allowed UN
‘security police’ to protect UNHCR and NGO facilities, though the UN did not have adequate
staff to fill those roles, so it cobbled together a mixture of UN staffers and individual contractors
from private relief organizations.143 A transition period ensuring the ability of UN security police
and the Peshmerga to protect the area was coupled with negotiations with the Iraqi government.
In these negotiations, JTF officials stressed that the “Combined Brigade Task Force was on full
alert and ready to reenter Iraq.” 144 This move was aimed at deterring aggressive actions by the
Iraqi military following JTF withdrawal. There were also explicit contingency plans in place for
potential conflict, and JTF air power continued regular daily flights in and around the no-fly zone
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above northern Iraq.145 The transition ultimately proved successful, and the Kurds were left
mostly alone in northern Iraq. Over the following decades, bolstered by the deposition of
Hussein, the Iraq War, and ISIS’s invasion, the Kurds have continued to expand their military
and oil infrastructure, growing wealthier and more powerful.
Operation Provide Comfort was successful in achieving both its short-term goal of
stabilization and its long-term goal of providing humanitarian aid and eventually transitioning
peacefully to a new status quo for the region. It is important to note that, “throughout the most
demanding phases... the coalition [provided] the command and control, as well as the security,
airlift, and logistics needed to care for and resettle the refugees in northern Iraq.”146 The success
of the mission required coordination across a multinational coalition, including air power, ground
forces, and humanitarian branches aimed at providing food, shelter, and medical attention. Some
operations, such as retaking Dohuk, required all three of these groups to work together closely.
Not only did the JTF achieve these military goals and create a successful security area, but it
planned and executed a successful transition of power to the UNHCR and NGOs.

Analysis
McQueen writes that “the safe haven in northern Iraq was… successful… it provided
adequate security, and sustenance for the Kurds within their country of origin; it successfully
deterred through troops and air power any reprisals from Saddam Hussein; and it retained
sufficient international support to avoid the fracturing of the 1991 Gulf War coalition.”147
Ultimately, Operation Provide Comfort is a clear example of a successfully implemented safe
zone. It protected hundreds of thousands of Kurds from the Iraqi army, moved them to physically

145

Rudd, Intervention, 217.
Rudd, Intervention, 219.
147
McQueen, Intervention, 47.
146

50

safe locations, and transitioned power back to the Iraqi Kurds without incident. However, the
circumstances that allowed the JTF to implement the safe zone in this successful manner are
specific and not reproducible, at least as a sustainable framework for humanitarian intervention.
The actors involved, primarily the United States, had decent levels of interest in
instituting a safe zone to help the Iraqi Kurds. The US was not motivated solely by a sense of
responsibility for the role it played previously in the oppression of the Kurds, nor by the fact that
it had supported the Kurdish rebellion. The US was also driven by a desire to secure stability for
the region as a whole to help allies in the area, and using a no-fly zone to protect the safe area
additionally allowed U.S. Air Force personnel to spy on the Iraqi government.148 Other leading
coalition members also had interests that aligned with intervention. British Prime Minister John
Major sought to establish himself as an equal to his martial predecessor, Margaret Thatcher. The
French, in the face of growing international irrelevance, wanted to signal their continued
importance on the world stage.149 None of these interests, however, seem large enough to
motivate these nations to risk the lives of their soldiers in executing the safe zone. These interests
would inform a level of willingness to become involved in the conflict, but with each of these
states lacking a serious security interest in the region and the Iraqi Kurds, that willingness would
not be large enough to surmount the practical challenges of the situation.
If the interests of the states involved were low, and willingness was accordingly not
commensurate with the challenges of implementing the safe zone, how was Operation Provide
Comfort successful? The answer lies in the fact that these nations did not have to have a level of
willingness high enough to surmount the practical challenges that generally accompany safe
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areas. Most of the practical challenges that needed to be addressed with the safe zone in northern
Iraq had already been surmounted by Desert Storm. All of the aspects that needed to be
considered and organized to undertake the humanitarian relief mission had already been executed
for the military operation conducted against Iraq. The interests and willingness of the actors only
had to be large enough to surmount the very low cost of implementing Operation Provide
Comfort. The actors did not have to gather, arm, or coordinate forces. Additionally, and very
notably, the cost of implementing the safe zone did not involve a large risk of danger for JTF
troops. The JTF had already clearly shown its ability to mount military operations and inflict
harm against Iraq. Those reassurances allowed the JTF to feel fairly confident that it would not
receive much pushback from the Iraqi army. Ultimately, the practical challenges and possible
costs of the intervention, both financial and in terms of loss of life, were very low. Because these
obstacles were uniquely small, the marginal interests of the actors created enough willingness to
surmount these challenges.
It is also important to note that, because of Desert Storm, the JTF was able to largely
ignore the concepts of impartiality and neutrality. It was already clear and established that the
JTF was not a neutral and impartial force. Its position as both relatively insulated from danger,
and also capable of responding to it, additionally did not incentivize it to hide behind the tenets
of impartiality and neutrality. Since the JTF was neither constrained by the ideals of impartiality
and neutrality nor could JTF soldiers use those tenets to justify inaction, the implementation of
the safe area was well-coordinated and successful. Ultimately, impartiality and neutrality either
constrain the tools at an intervening actor’s disposal, making the task at hand more difficult, or
the tenets provide cover for intervening forces to make decisions prioritizing their safety over the
safety of the group they have intervened to protect. Because of the unique situation of the JTF
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during Operation Provide Comfort, these complicating considerations played no role in the
mission.
Another aspect that aided the success of the mission was the fact that the soldiers
involved in the multinational coalition reported directly to their normal military superiors, who
coordinated amongst themselves and their nations at a higher level. While these soldiers were at
a disconnect to the people they were protecting, similar to the peacekeepers considered during
the Bosnia case study, the soldiers were operating within their normal military framework.
Additionally, the JTF was comprised of the same forces that had bolstered the US military during
Desert Storm. All of the logistical problems of coordinating with forces across countries had
already been sorted out prior to the Gulf War. McQueen writes that:
the multilateral pursuit of community interests throughout the Gulf Conflict
period
later facilitated from an instrumental perspective the adoption of a safety zone approach… the
channels of communication developed during the hostilities with Iraq remained in place and
eased decision-making about how to proceed with the safe haven policy. The military activities
of the three contributors, the US,
Britain and France, were easily coordinated, so the safe
haven was mounted effectively in record time. As the costs and tasks of the operation were
spread among 30 states, no one state bore too great a burden.150
In short, the unique situation of the Gulf War preceding the implementation of the safe area in
northern Iraq positioned the multinational force remarkably well to undertake its task. Not only
were all aspects of interoperability already established and tested, but the burden of funding was
distributed across numerous actors.
Additionally, in terms of the success of the operational aspects of the safe zone, the
physical task was not particularly difficult. The hardest part was physically finding Kurds in the
widespread, remote area. The JTF did not have to worry about distinguishing between groups of
individuals or making moral decisions regarding which individuals would be allowed entrance

150

McQueen, Intervention, 37.

53

into safe areas. Northern Iraq already was inhabited almost entirely by Kurds, so the forces only
needed to find them. This concentration of the Kurds also made it easier to create and protect the
safe zone; a hard barrier and no-fly zone at the 36th parallel was the clear option. The forces did
not have to worry about a safe area surrounded on all sides by belligerents. Instead, there was a
clear barrier to protect, and all other borders of the safe area were with other countries.
It is also valuable to note that the movement of individuals is less problematic in this case
study than in the previous discussion of Srebrenica. While Operation Provide Comfort did
involve the physical movement of people into camps, it was with the express purpose of
providing aid more effectively. There was an undeniable interest on the part of the JTF to keep
the Kurds in Iraq to avoid destabilizing the region, but the JTF also had legitimate and practical
humanitarian intentions in gathering Kurds. Once the Kurds were gathered and resettled in
camps, they were given aid and support by JTF forces in ways that would not have been possible
if Kurds remained spread across a large and mountainous geographic area. The retaking of
Dohuk further ensured that the safe area included a town with appropriate urban facilities to
render aid. Additionally, “without including Dohuk in the security zone there wouldn’t be
enough of a populated area with urban facilities to get the Kurds moving back.”151 While it
aligned with the interests of the intervening actor to keep the Kurds in northern Iraq, the JTF also
expended a large amount of energy to ensure that the Kurds were protected and comfortable.
Overall, the JTF’s actions demonstrate a genuine humanitarian concern and a commitment to
helping the Kurds rebuild and maintain a community.
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As interest and willingness were great enough to meet the challenges of safe zones in this
case, the proposed method would generally conclude that moral hazard played no role in
Operation Provide Comfort. McQueen, however, suggests that there was a moral hazard
problem. She identifies moral hazard in the events following JTF withdrawal from Iraq.
McQueen finds problems with the lack of serious diplomatic talks at the end of Operation
Provide Comfort which could have clearly established northern Iraq as autonomous or pursued
its reintegration into Iraq. Rather than resolving these questions, the ability to pass off
responsibility to the UN and NGOs created a moral hazard for the JTF. She critiques that,
“[Operation Provide Comfort’s] one significant drawback was that its implementation was not
linked to a broader solution to the Iraqi problem; the coalition that established it was eager to
withdraw, so no clear provisions were put in place to reintegrate the safe haven and its
surroundings into Iraq or to clarify the area’s status generally beyond autonomy in a de facto
sense.”152 However, there are serious problems with McQueen’s argument. First, the idea that
northern Iraq could have been reintegrated into Iraq in a successful manner that ensured the
continued safety of the Kurds is ridiculous; Iraqi history provided a clear roadmap to show that
this eventuality was virtually impossible, and as such, would have been irresponsible for the JTF
to pursue. Second, the likelihood that Iraq would have willingly agreed to the secession of
northern Iraq is nonexistent. It is not reasonable to expect that the JTF would have been willing
to force Iraq’s hand militarily or with serious political action. The JTF had neither the interest
nor the will to pursue the conflict beyond ensuring the safety of Iraqi Kurds. Additionally, as the
end of Operation Provide Comfort unfolded, the JTF did help train the Peshmerga and maintain
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the no-fly zone. At the very least, these actions allowed Iraqi Kurds the time and space necessary
to rebuild and train their own military so that they could later take on their own defense.
The circumstances that led to the success of the safe zone in Iraqi Kurdistan were so
specific and fortuitous that they are unlikely to be reproduced in humanitarian crises in the
coming decades. However, in discussing the success of Operation Provide Comfort, it needs to
be clear that the JTF did not succeed because it recognized the shortcomings of humanitarian
intervention and changed their plans accordingly. Operation Provide Comfort was a successful
intervention because external, irreproducible factors aligned the JTF’s low level of interests and
willingness with low practical challenges. This intervention avoided the classic trap of lack of
interest, low willingness, moral hazard, and poor outcome purely coincidentally. It is clear that
the success of Operation Provide Comfort was due to these lucky circumstances and not a larger
understanding of the problems inherent to humanitarian intervention. This fact is clear in how the
JTF handled its withdrawal from northern Iraq. The UN ‘security police’ and cobbled-together
staff left in northern Iraq were entirely incapable of defending the safe area and had less interest
and willingness to do so than the JTF. Northern Iraq only continued to be safe because of the
credible threat of US retaliation if Iraq violated the no-fly zone and the additional deterrent of the
Peshmerga. While it is important to look at this successful case of humanitarian intervention to
see what conditions allowed the policy to be implemented effectively, it is also vitally important
to note that almost all of those conditions were coincidental and unique to this situation.
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Case Study: Operation Turquoise, Rwanda
History
The 1994 genocide in Rwanda was one of the most horrifying events of modern times. In
a matter of months, over 800,000 Rwandans, mostly of the Tutsi ethnic group, were killed, and
over two million Rwandans, mostly of the Hutu ethnic group, fled the country.153 The
international community’s relative lack of intervention and the role of colonialism in creating the
ethnic tensions within the nation characterize the Rwandan genocide.
Rwanda is “one of the few African countries with only two significant ethnic groups,
with Hutus (85%) and Tutsis (14%) accounting for most of the population.”154 When Germany
colonized the nation in 1895, it supported the existing Tutsi monarchy, and after Rwanda shifted
hands to Belgium following WWI, the Tutsis continued to be the favored group. The Belgian
government supported Tutsis over Hutus as the group in power because of the Hamitic
hypothesis that “African ‘civilization’ was due to racially distinct Caucasoid invaders from the
north/northeast of Africa.”155 The notion that Tutsis were Hamites was based on the observations
of German and Belgian colonial officials noting that since “[Tutsis] ruled over a majority, they
‘must’ possess incongruous martial skill and intelligence, which, combined with the observation
that the Tutsi… possessed a different physiology to that of the Hutu, was taken to indicate Tutsi
provenance outside of Rwanda.”156 Essentially, the Belgians supported the Tutsi minority as the
main governing group because they believed them to be more Caucasian. The Belgian
government began a policy of Tutsification, instituting a system of Tutsi-led chiefdoms,
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mandatory ethnic identity cards, elite schools only for Tutsis, and new laws to oppress Hutus.157
It is also important to note that another motivation likely played into the decisions the Belgians
made as colonizers. A common method of ruling colonies during that time period was ‘divide
and rule,’ which Richard Morrock defines in his essay, Heritage of Strife: The Effects of
Colonialist "Divide and Rule" Strategy upon the Colonized Peoples, as, “ the conscious effort of
an imperialist power to create and/or turn to its own advantage the ethnic, linguistic, cultural,
tribal, or religious differences within the population of a subjugated colony.”158 Favoring a
minority granted a cohesive identity and social position to a small portion of the population; by
far the majority of the population remained scattered, disenfranchised, and without resources,
bolstering the power of the Belgians.
A 1961 coup eventually established a Hutu-led government, which, over time, led to
discrimination against Tutsis, including rules that allocated government funds and resources to
Tutsis on the basis of their percentage in the population.159 Tensions continued to increase over
the following years as Tutsi guerilla groups attacked Hutus, eliciting reprisal attacks on Tutsis.
Tutsis began to flee the country as refugees, and, in 1987, Tutsi exiles in Uganda created the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) with the political goal of returning Tutsi refugees to Rwanda.160
A series of negotiations to ease tensions between the ethnic groups and create a system of
government in Rwanda that could support a sustainable peace between Hutus and Tutsis
collapsed in 1990 when the RPF invaded Rwanda. While the Arusha Peace Agreement, a
compromise that included most of the RPF’s wishes and the creation of the UN Assistance
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Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), ended the conflict in 1993, many Hutus believed it to be too
generous.161 The tenuous peace quickly began to deteriorate and, “alarming information...
continued to pour into UNAMIR headquarters.”162 Even the CIA issued a report predicting the
failure of the Arusha compromise and the beginning of mass violence.163
On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana, a Hutu, was assassinated. His plane was shot
down during landing at the airport in Kigali,164 though it remains unclear whether the mortar was
launched by Tutsi rebels or Hutu extremists.165 Regardless of the group that initiated the
assassination, it set the following genocide and civil war (between the Tutsi RPF and Hutu
Rwandan government forces) into motion as death squads began killing Tutsis and moderate
Hutus.166 While, in the conflict that followed, most systematic killings took place in areas held
by the Rwandan government, the RPF also murdered thousands of Hutus, and the dangers of
fleeing and poor conditions in refugee camps further increased the death toll.167
The UN, despite UNAMIR’s presence in Rwanda, stayed largely on the sidelines of the
conflict. On the heels of the spectacular international failure in Somalia, many thought that “to
repeat the failure... would fatally damage the credibility of the UN.”168 The UN justified its lack
of action by, “[characterizing] the situation predominantly as a resumed civil war,” between the
RPF and Rwandan government forces.169 Finally, the Security Council passed Resolution 918 on
May 17, 1994, calling for an expansion of UNAMIR’s mandate to alleviate the suffering of the
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Rwandan people, including through “the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of
secure humanitarian areas.”170 The Resolution also called for UNAMIR to provide security to
humanitarian relief shipments, emboldened UNAMIR troops to act in self-defense when
protected areas or individuals were at risk, and asked for member states to help supply 5,500
troops to undertake these responsibilities.171 It is important to note that an estimated 200,000500,000 of the ultimate 800,000 deaths had already happened by the end of April 1994 when the
UN passed Resolution 918.172
The UN, however, was unwilling to actualize the extension of UNAMIR’s mandate,
despite the passage of Resolution 918. This reluctance eventually opened the door for another
actor to play a defining role in intervention. It ended up being the French who, in early July,
established a ‘safe humanitarian zone’ in Rwanda as part of a relief effort named Operation
Turquoise (OT).173 French Prime Minister Alain Juppé argued that OT would follow the
guidelines Resolution 918 set forth for UNAMIR. France would essentially fulfill UNAMIR’s
goals as a temporary proxy. Resolution 929, passed by the Security Council in late June,
legitimized and reiterated Juppé’s goal by authorizing the French intervention until such a time
that UNAMIR could fulfill the original mandate put forth by Resolution 918. Resolution 929
asserted, “the strictly humanitarian character of this operation which shall be conducted in an
impartial and neutral fashion, and shall not constitute an interposition force between the
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parties… [and which supports] the security… of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at
risk.”174
Juppé billed OT as a simple moral undertaking, saying, “are there not times where the
sense of honor and the most elementary morality dictate the taking of risks?”175 However, the
reality is significantly more complicated. France had been a supporter of the Hutu regime for
decades; the nation had even signed a military agreement with Hutu strongman and eventual
president Juvenal Habyarimana in 1975. Habyarimana regularly visited France over his lifetime
and had a close personal relationship with President Mitterand.176 When France decided to
launch OT in 1994, it had been supporting Habyarimana’s government against the RPF with
weapons and tactical support since 1990.177 Some lines of scholarship suggest that French
motivations underlying support for the Hutu regime were largely sentimental; “France claimed
Rwanda as a solid member of the Francophone bloc, viewed from Paris as a great family with
itself as a generous and indulgent parent.”178 In light of these ties, many countries and the RPF
were wary of allowing France to intervene in the country. Landgren wrote that “the reluctance of
many governments to see France involved militarily in Rwanda cannot be overstated, however,
and stemmed from concerns that France’s interest in the situation was not neutral.”179 Skeptics
even argued that the humanitarian relief effort could be a thinly-veiled French attempt to aid the
Hutu government in regaining control of the country.
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In The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda, Alan Kuperman notes
that the motivations surrounding French involvement in the Rwandan genocide is a continued
debate in international politics and academia. Kuperman argues that, “France’s decision to
intervene was compelled by French public outcry over continuing reports of anti-Tutsi
atrocities,” but he recognizes how Human Rights Watch found evidence supporting that,
“elements within the French defense establishment managed to funnel small amounts of arms
and advice to the Hutu army from the outbreak of renewed fighting in April 1994… five
additional arms shipments were sent from France to Rwanda through Zaire in May and June
1994.”180 Kuperman identifies the ‘elements of the French defense establishment’ to be
coordinated by a retired French officer on the payroll of the French government, operating out of
the French embassy in Kigali.181 It is important to note, however, that France did not become
involved in the conflict until the very end of June, and the safe zone was not established until
July, so French physical involvement in the conflict was not concurrent to the covert arms
shipments.
France argued publicly, however, that its plan had three main aims, all consistent with the
wishes of the international community. The French aimed first to stop the flow of refugees into
neighboring countries, both because of the poor humanitarian conditions in the camps, and also
the possible destabilizing effects of the mass migration. Second, France aimed to fulfill
UNAMIR’s duty of creating and sustaining a safe humanitarian zone until a ceasefire could be
reached. Third, France aimed to offer neutral and impartial assistance to those in need.182
Ultimately, in the face of the UN’s own reluctance to become involved in the conflict, the UN
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could hardly denounce French plans to provide humanitarian aid in Rwanda, when French public
aims were so in line with the wishes of the international community. In the absence of an
organized international response to block France’s efforts, France was allowed to go forward
with OT.
The French established a very large safe humanitarian zone in the Cyangugu-KibuyeGikongoro area of southwest Rwanda in late June 1994.183 The forces numbered 2,900 French
military personnel, 1,200 of whom were combat troops, and they had 100 armed vehicles, 600
other vehicles, 10 helicopters, and 12 combat aircraft.184 While somewhat well-armed, the forces
were protecting a swath of land roughly one-fifth the size of Rwanda.185 Additionally, the safe
zone was established in an area where approximately 1.2 million individuals were already living.
Some of the individuals in the safe zone were refugees, and some of were citizens of that area;
the individuals already in the safe zone comprised both Hutus and Tutsis.186 Additionally,
individuals of all identities, but particularly Hutus, were constantly moving through the safe zone
as the front of the conflict grew closer to the safe area. As the front pushed west through
Rwanda, the RPF began winning, and the Hutu government forces were on the defensive.
The large scope of the safe zone meant that there was less than one troop per square mile
of the safe zone, and there were 1.5 troops per one thousand individuals in the area.187 Because
there were so few troops compared to the population living in the safe area, and given the
acreage of the safe area, it was difficult for the French to find Tutsis. The French forces were
really only successful in finding and bringing Tutsis to better-protected areas within the safe
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zone when the Tutsis were gathered in large groups, like the roughly 10,000 Tutsis who, “were
saved at the stadium in Cyangugu.”188 The French forces were less successful at finding and
helping Tutsis spread across the large swaths of land in the safe zone because they lacked
personnel and vehicles, but also because they were afraid of Hutu or Tutsi militia forces hiding
in the bush.189 The French forces did succeed in gathering surviving Rwandans in the safe zone
into camps where they could protect them and provide them with aid more effectively, though a
large number of these surviving Rwandans were Hutu.190 The French allowed Hutus already
within the safe zone to stay, spanning from civilians to militia members and interim government
officials, and the soldiers allowed genocidaires and militiamen taking refuge from the
approaching Tutsi army to enter the safe zone. Notably, allowing all groups of individuals into
the safe area was technically required by Resolution 929’s call for impartiality and neutrality in
the execution of the mandate.
While the French efforts undoubtedly saved lives, allowing the rival ethnic groups to
occupy the same space led to “several thousand others probably [being] killed in the zone during
the French occupation. French troops also did not intervene to stop looting or to arrest
extremists. Lacking the forces, mandate, and interest to serve as a police force, they did not do
so.”191 While mentions of death and looting exist in other sources such as Mel McNulty’s
France’s Role in Rwanda and External Military Intervention, no sources offer further
illumination regarding the looting and death within the safe zone, or numbers to explain its
scope. This lack of information is likely due to the chaos and brevity of the safe zone, the poor
documentation of events on the ground during that period, and the sustained French refusal to
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open its archives regarding OT to the international community. It is likely, however, that there
was ethnic conflict between Tutsis and Hutus in the safe zone because, as stated, the French
could not patrol the area effectively. Just as there was widespread murder, looting, and chaos in
Rwanda as a whole during this time, many of those same characteristics likely also existed in the
safe zone.
Ultimately, Operation Turquoise saved an estimated 15,000 to 17,000 Tutsis.192 The RPF
beat the remaining Rwandan government forces on July 13, 1994, and a new government was
sworn in on July 19th in Kigali. The entire French mission to create and maintain a safe zone in
Rwanda lasted only a number of weeks and notably came after a vast majority of the murders
had already been committed. When the French left Rwanda in the middle of August, the OT safe
area was passed to the jurisdiction of UNAMIR, in accordance with Resolution 929, which
required power to eventually be shifted back to the UN-run force. UNAMIR was likely able to
finally amass appropriate troop numbers and funding in the wake of the conflict because the
objective of reconstruction was slightly clearer, and the likelihood of facing danger was
significantly lower. Additionally, in the wake of such widespread and extreme violence, the
international community was willing to invest in rebuilding, where it had not been willing to
invest in aiding one side or the other during the war.
In the years following the conflict, many of the “the internally displaced were abruptly
and, in places, violently dispersed out of the former safe zone,” both by the new Tutsi-led
Rwandan government forces and other remaining militias.193 While the safe zone was under
UNAMIR’s control during this time, the French left quickly and without a plan to transition
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individuals from the camps back into society. Rwanda has, however, made a remarkable
recovery overall in the past three decades. From 1994, when it was, “desperately poor, without
skilled labor and resources, and the people demoralized and divided,” to today, unbelievable
reconciliation and progress have occurred.194 Security and stability efforts coupled with
international humanitarian relief have helped forge the beginning of a new national identity for
Rwandans.

Analysis
Ultimately, the French safe zone in Rwanda served part of its purpose; it saved roughly
15,000 Tutsis who otherwise likely would have been killed as part of the genocide. Notably,
however, the number of individuals who died in the safe zone, either from ethnic violence or
other forms of violence, is not known. The safe zone was too brief and instituted too late to have
a larger positive effect. Saving 15,000 lives is remarkable, but the Rwandan genocide saw the
deaths of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis, most of which occurred in the early stages of the
genocide, and the French were only involved in humanitarian relief efforts for the last month of a
three-month conflict. While this short time frame constrained the positive effects the French
could have, this analysis will address how the short time frame might also have mitigated some
of the negative effects the safe zone could have had.
First and foremost, it is important to fully deconstruct interest in this case. It is clear that
the UN had an interest in the conflict, mainly because the international community expected the
UN to fulfill its duty in addressing crises such as genocide. Not undertaking such a task,
especially in the face of widespread international pressure, would likely corrode the legitimacy
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of the UN. While the UN surely also had a vested interest in the safety and well-being of the
Rwandan people, the decisions it made as an institution revolved around larger political
considerations. The UN needed to address the genocide in some fashion, but it was largely
unwilling to do so in the face of failed humanitarian intervention in Somalia. It is clear that the
UN was struggling with this problem of interest as it equivocated about the status of the conflict
in Rwanda in the early stages, shrinking away from calling it a genocide. The UN did not have
an interest large enough to cobble together forces, arm them, and deploy them with a clear
objective. The UN did, however, have to at least appear to be addressing the conflict. The French
desire to intervene accordingly created a moral hazard the United Nations could take advantage
of. The UN had the opportunity to legitimize French operations under the banner of the UN. The
UN could legitimize the intervention despite murky French intentions, and ease international
pressure on the UN to address the conflict itself. If the UN blocked the French intervention and
then did not become involved itself, it would incur the wrath of the international community. For
the UN, the answer was simple.
France had interests in the conflict, though they were purely political. While these
interests were the main motivating factor for its involvement, they were not particularly intense
and revolved around the French government’s affinity for the Hutu regime. At the very least,
“France propped up an increasingly extremist regime, did not use its leverage over the Rwandan
government to greater positive effect, and failed to take any action to halt the genocide when it
started.”195 France did not have a broader national security interest in Rwanda, nor an economic
or military interest. The closest to a strategic interest it could have had in Rwanda was
supporting a fellow Francophone nation in a world increasingly dominated by Anglophone
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culture. McQueen argues that “The global dominance of Anglophone language and culture, as
well as American economic might, came to be seen as threats to France’s state interests.”196
While France was perhaps propelled into eventual involvement in the conflict by widespread
public concern for the Tutsis as Kuperman suggests, it is clear that France was not motivated
only by horror at the genocide. France had a close personal, military, and political relationship
with the party perpetrating the genocide.
It is not clear what the goals of French involvement in the Rwandan conflict were, but
they likely aligned with the type of argument Kuperman puts forth. He argues that, while there
was a close relationship between the French government and the Hutu interim government, and
that relationship included arming Hutu militias in the early days of the genocide, “the evidence
suggests that France had already abandoned any intention of supporting the [Hutu military] in
northwestern Rwanda by the end of the operation’s first week.”197 The French force entered
Rwanda through the Hutu stronghold in the northwestern corner of the nation, and continued
southwest without aiding Hutu forces, “despite pleas from [Hutu militias] and from Rwanda’s
Hutu government.”198 Additionally, upon entering the country, many French soldiers were
immediately disillusioned; any affinity the French infantrymen felt for the Hutu vanished when
they saw the violence levied against the Tutsis.199 It cannot be known what the original aims of
the French government were, but it is clear from the very beginning of the intervention that the
French force was not going to actively aid Hutu militias or the Hutu interim government.
It is important to look at will in this case to explain the events that took place after this
original refusal to aid various Hutu forces. Though France had political interests in Rwanda, they
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were not particularly binding or vital. Its level of interest was inadequate to muster the
appropriate funding, effort, or coordination necessary to overcome the practical problems of safe
zone implementation, which were particularly large in Rwanda. The large scope of the safe zone
meant that there was less than one troop per square mile of the safe zone, and there were 1.5
troops per one thousand individuals in the area.200 The general rule for military interventions and
operations is, at a minimum, a troop density of 20 soldiers to every 1,000 individuals.201 It is
important to note here that there is no information readily available on why the French sent so
few troops and such improper armaments, especially to establish such a large safe zone in an
area already home to over a million individuals, not all of whom were civilians, and not all of
whom were Tutsi. Some lines of scholarship suggest that French soldiers were more improperly
armed than poorly armed because they had armaments conducive to war fighting instead of
providing humanitarian aid.202 However, if French intentions were actually martial and revolved
around aiding the Hutus in regaining power, what would justify the small number of soldiers the
French sent? While perhaps these assertions could explain the situation with the French
armaments, they cannot explain the low number of French soldiers. Ultimately, it is likely that
the small force was due to French political will; that number was all the nation could muster the
will to send, and perhaps, a year before the events of Bosnia proved how many soldiers were
truly necessary to protect a safe zone, France convinced itself that such a small number of troops
would somehow be able to accomplish the task at hand. Indeed, the French suggestion to the UN
to send a large number of well-armed troops to hold the safe zone in Bosnia occurred after
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Operation Turquoise. Perhaps France was either ignorant of the true challenges its soldiers would
face with implementing the safe zone in Rwanda, or it was overcome with hubris that only a
force of that size was needed to achieve French goals for the conflict.
The French forces feared violence, and that consideration informed numerous aspects of
their behavior. They let Hutus into the safe zone and allowed those already within the area to
stay. The French forces did not stop looting and violence within the safe zone, either amongst
groups or between them, out of fear that they themselves would face harm. Those fears are
notably not irrational, coming from forces outnumbered literally one thousand to one.
Ultimately, the French chose to allow the Hutu government, army, and militias to flee to Zaire as
a method of keeping relative peace in the safe zone.203 While French actions may have aligned
with concerns that France would support the Hutus, they also aligned with the very real and
present threat of violence. Heavily outmanned and outnumbered, the most logical action the
French could have taken was allowing Hutus into the safe zone and eventually allowing them to
flee the area. While letting these Hutus flee into Zaire allowed them to avoid revenge killings
and eventually trials, letting them flee also aided the French in keeping relative peace in a very
tenuous situation.
It is additionally important to discuss how keeping the safe zone open to all individuals
was justified by the specific mandates of OT, both as set forth in Resolution 929 and by the selfimposed French mandate. While it may seem absurd that France let Hutu militias and Hutu
extremist government officials into its safe zone, those actions are required by impartiality and
neutrality. Expecting French forces to only offer safety to one group would actually undermine
impartiality and neutrality. It is, however, important to also note that had they had a motive to
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harbor Hutus, French forces could have done so under the protection of impartiality and
neutrality. These observations are not meant to argue that French actions were or were not just,
or that they did or did not follow a mandate, but rather to point out the disparity between
international legal frameworks and the reality of conflict. The question of impartiality and
neutrality is interesting in most cases of safe zone usage, but these questions are particularly
powerful in the context of Rwanda. The specific safe zone implemented during the genocide was
so strongly plagued by issues of impartiality and neutrality because the group the safe zone was
created to protect quickly became the dominant group in the conflict. The former aggressor
group became the target, and large numbers of Hutus were being pushed toward the safe zone by
the military front.
Ultimately, French inability to save more Tutsis either by gathering them in safer areas or
by policing violence within the safe zone was a failure of the French to actualize their mandate
as the intervening force. Had the French had appropriate interests and will to either execute a
smaller, more effective safe zone, or to have mobilized a larger, better-armed force, they perhaps
could have avoided these failures. Additionally, with those better resources, perhaps they could
have repelled fleeing Hutus or stopped Hutus within the safe area from fleeing into Zaire. As it
played out, however, the French did not have much of a choice but to let them enter and to
eventually let them flee. To view those acts solely as in line with French affinity toward the Hutu
regime is to misunderstand the problem at hand; these decisions were made first and foremost
from a weak tactical position, with survival in mind.
While the safe zone itself was not a massive failure, it is impossible to know what would
have happened had the war lasted longer. If the RPF had not already been winning decisively
when the French began the safe zone, the conflict could have played out very differently. If the
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interim government or Hutu militias had been stronger, France’s inability to enforce or police the
safe zone could have been disastrous. It is additionally unclear what would have happened if the
Hutu extremists won the conflict, and France was in control of a concentrated group of Tutsis.
While it is not valuable to consider hypotheticals with the goal of actually reaching answers, the
aim of posing these questions is to emphasize how treacherous the situation in Rwanda was, and,
in a broader sense, how treacherous it is to create safe zones without well-armed, appropriately
manned groups protecting them. Ultimately, not only do safe zone have a slew of practical and
structural problems associated with them, but they can create a large moral hazard for the
international community in addition to the intervening body. The system is such that the UN
legitimized the intervention of an actor with potentially nefarious motives.
Lastly, it is important to note two aspects of the Rwandan genocide to offer a full picture
of the conflict. The first is that, underlying the success of Rwanda’s post-conflict nationbuilding, old wounds still fester. In December of 2017, the Rwandan government released a
report naming France complicit in the genocide.204 The report states, “that French military forces
trained their Rwandan counterparts, supplied them with weapons even after an arms embargo,
and gave cover, under the auspices of a United Nations-sanctioned humanitarian mission, in the
last moments of a genocidal campaign.”205 In 2009, Rwanda announced, “an ambitious plan to
switch the entire education system to English and effectively purge the country of French as it is
forced out of the workings of government.”206 Notably, in April 2019, French President
Emmanuel Macron made the groundbreaking decision to call for a report on French involvement
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in the genocide, relying on previously sealed French archives.207 This report, however, is
scheduled to take two years to pull together, and there should be suspicion amongst the
international community as to whether the final report is sanitized or tempered. If President
Macron truly had nothing to hide, and was either not afraid of what French archives would
reveal, or was willing to own up to whatever material is within them, he would have made the
archives open to Rwandan researchers.
Second, it is important to acknowledge and discuss the fact that sexual assault against
local women (and likely men) by French forces was a prominent aspect of Operation Turquoise,
as “numerous reports cite French soldiers trading sexual favors for food and medical supplies,
[and] raping… Rwandan civilians.” 208 This aspect of the conflict is vital to note because sexual
violence is oftentimes forgotten in narratives of conflict and suffering, but it is a traumatic and
dehumanizing form of assault that needs to be discussed. Additionally, the rape of Rwandan
civilians shows an important problem with safe zones and humanitarian intervention in general;
there is no one policing the police force. An intervening third party can essentially act with
impunity. The parties involved in a conflict are likely too busy to begin fighting an intervening
force or are incapable of doing so, and the international community is unlikely to respond in any
way other than condemnation, and even then, it would likely only do so after the conflict ended.
Ultimately, an intervening party has a position of power and freedom from the consequences of
abusing it.
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Case Study: Syrian Civil War
History
The civil war in Syria, now in its eighth year, is one of the most complicated and
devastating conflicts of modern time. The complexity includes both the domestic actors, and also
global powers including the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, Iran, and terrorist organizations,
all with different ideologies and goals. At this point in time, the conflict has claimed the lives of
465,000 Syrians, and over twelve million citizens, roughly half of the population, have been
displaced.209
The roots of the current civil war are found in the Arab Spring. Beginning in 2011,
protests in Tunisia and later Egypt eventually ousted autocratic regimes. In the wake of such
success in these two nations, citizens in counties across northern Africa and the Middle East took
to the streets, hoping that similar protests could force democratic change in their own
communities. In March of 2011, thousands of Syrians began protesting the arrests of several
young boys who had been caught graffitiing in support of the Arab Spring; one of them, only
thirteen years old, died after brutal torture.210 While Syrians were specifically protesting the
treatment of the boys, they were also protesting their autocratic president, Bashar al-Assad, and
the general oppressive nature of the Syrian government. Not only was the political situation in
Syria dictatorial, but Assad and most government officials were of the Alawite minority group, a
branch of Shia Islam, while the majority of citizens in Syria were Sunni Muslims.211 In addition
to the Arab Spring, a number of external factors also likely played a role in sparking the protests.
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Widespread drought, attributed by many to climate change, had plagued the nation for over three
years, forcing millions of citizens into urban population centers, fueling the general sense of
discontent.212
Where similar outpourings of public discontent had forced governmental change in
Tunisia and Egypt, Assad responded to the protests in Syria by, “by killing hundreds of
demonstrators and imprisoning many more.”213 While the protests and movements in Tunisia
and Egypt had not been entirely peaceful, the brutality of the Assad regime was severe. In late
July, following months of violence perpetrated by the Assad regime against the people, the
Syrian army defected from the government, forming the Free Syrian Army.214 The civil war truly
began in the summer of 2011 between the Syrian government and the Free Syrian Army. The
following months were plagued with fighting that did not seem to be going anywhere. According
to Samer Abboud in Syria, “The militarization of the uprising— and the subsequent inability of
the political or military opposition to overthrow the regime— led to the dramatic expansion of
violence, the proliferation of different armed groups, and the territorial fragmentation of the
country.”215
In the face of growing violence and brutality, both between the Free Syrian Army and the
Assad regime, but also leveled against innocents in population centers where fighting was taking
place, concern began to grow the international community. France and Russia denounced, “the
growing carnage,” the Arab League suspended Syria’s membership, and the U.S. sanctioned the
nation, citing human rights abuses.216 In early January 2012, an al-Qaeda offshoot called Jabhat
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al-Nusra announced their entrance into the conflict in opposition to Assad, beginning the
involvement of terrorist groups in the conflict.217 This shift allowed the Assad regime to frame
their brutal attacks as fighting extremism, which additionally allowed the Syrian government to
group all rebel factions together as radical terrorist groups.218 Violence continued mounting and
spreading across Syria throughout 2012, fueled by a new influx of weapons.219 A number of
ceasefires, including one organized by Kofi Annan and approved the UN Security Council, were
implemented in response to the brutality of the conflict, but all of them quickly failed.220 U.S.
President Obama, increasingly concerned that a desperate Assad would turn to even more
horrifying military tactics, issued the famous ‘red line,’ in the same year, stating that Assad’s use
of chemical weapons would be the final tipping point for American entrance into the conflict.221
It is also important to note that, amidst the mounting violence, the number of Syrians fleeing the
nation, namely into bordering Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, though also to European nations and
other countries across the globe, began to increase heavily.
During the early days of the revolution, it became clear that opposition groups
(interchangeably referred to as rebel groups) were varied and disorganized. They spanned
Marxist groups, pan-Arab groups, democratic groups, Kurdish fighters, terrorist organizations,
and larger, more legitimate groups such as the Free Syrian Army. It falls outside of the scope of
this paper to consider all of the rebel groups and their motivations, but it is valuable to note that
in the early years of the conflict, “Polyglot opposition groups formed, making them difficult to
distinguish between… the anti-Assad opposition suffered from a lack of both unity and
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purpose.”222 The constant fracturing and infighting amongst rebel groups also made it difficult
for the international community to support the opposition; it was unclear which group or groups
to support, or if any one group could be successful in such a splintered field. In the midst of this
conflict in 2014, a new party came to the fore in Iraq and in the Syrian civil war: ISIS
(interchangeably referred to as IS and ISIL). While the Islamic State, led by Abu Bakr alBaghdadi, posed a significant threat to Assad, it also posed a significant threat to every other
party in the conflict, to the Iraqi government, and to many actors in the international order. IS
quickly took control of parts of central Syria, and large territories in Iraq; though it started as an
al-Qaeda splinter group, the ultimate goal of IS was to create a caliphate across Syria and Iraq,
and even beyond. By 2015, it was becoming increasingly unclear who was fighting for what
objective, because the original conflict between Assad and the rebels had mushroomed into a
conflict mired in complicated alliances and a fight against extremism. The Syrian Observatory on
Human Rights reported that, by February 2015, 200,000 individuals had died, 28,277 of whom
had been killed in shootings or mass executions, and a further 18,866 civilians had died in
government air strikes.223 Syria, a once moderately wealthy country, was mired in poverty, and
in many places, food and medicine had become scarce. Roughly four million Syrians were
external refugees, namely in neighboring countries, including nearly 2.2 million in Turkey.224
By 2015, roughly a year after IS’s entrance into the conflict, most of the main players in
the Syrian civil war had solidified. The civil war in Syria additionally became an international
proxy war built on powers struggles, alliances, and an age-old conflict between the Sunni and
Shia branches of Islam. Turkey, for example, “has a long, porous border with Syria,” and has
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denounced Assad’s violence since the beginning because of the economic and political toll that
Syrian refugees have on Turkey.225 Turkey, a Sunni majority nation, is additionally inclined to
oppose Assad’s regime on religious grounds. In terms of the fight against extremism, while
Turkey did not originally have a stake in fighting terrorism within Syria, the nation increased
cooperation with the U.S. to fight IS after an Islamic State suicide bombing in the Turkish city of
Suruc.226 At the same time that Turkey was increasing cooperation with U.S. forces, it stopped
coordinating with the People’s Protection Units (YPG)− a militia comprised of Kurds from
across the Middle East. Turkey stopped this coordination even though the YPG is aligned with
Turkey in fighting both Assad and IS.227 Turkey cut ties with this possibly valuable ally because
the Turkish government opposes the Kurds on ethnic and political grounds. Turkey has
domestically battled the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) for decades and believes there are ties
between the PKK and the YPG.228 Turkey has even carried out bombing campaigns against
Kurdish forces in Syria as they continue fighting against IS and Assad.229 While Turkey entered
the conflict out of opposition to Assad on religious and practical grounds, its interest has grown
to include counterterrorism considerations, both in terms of IS and the perceived threats from
Kurdish militias.
The U.S., mired in the lingering effects of the economic meltdown, and still entrenched in
Iraq Syndrome, was reluctant to become involved, and notably remained so even after Assad
crossed Obama’s ‘red line’ of chemical weapons use. The U.S. sought to arm and support
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moderate rebel groups against Assad’s brutal regime, but with the increasing splintering of the
opposition, America remained peripherally involved.230 It was not until the rise of IS and the
entrance of foes like Iran and Russia to the conflict that the U.S. had a serious interest in
becoming involved. These interests span countering Russian and Iranian influence globally, and
counterterrorism objectives, in addition to the U.S.’s original anti-Assad interest. To achieve
these objectives, the U.S. has doubled down on funneling arms and monetary support to allies
battling IS in the nation, namely Kurdish forces and the YPG in particular, putting Turkey and
the U.S. at odds with each other despite the fact they are aligned in battling IS and opposing
Assad.231
Iran is a close Syrian ally due to its Shia majority and a “culture that includes a selfidentified global responsibility to protect the interest of Middle Eastern Shia communities.”232
Iran also has vested interests in asserting its power in the region, particularly in relation to Sunni
Saudi Arabia, and in countering Western influence or ‘westtoxification’ in the area.233 This idea
of westtoxification relates mainly to the United States which, in addition to playing various
active roles in the region and pursuing a strong relationship with Saudi Arabia, has a long and
tense background with Iran. Iran also has an interest in ensuring that Syria remains an area
through which it can easily funnel resources to the Shia Hezbollah in Lebanon.234 Iran began
supporting the Assad regime early in the conflict for a confluence of these reasons; the nation
sent funding and weapons to Syria, and additionally, “sent in experienced Iranian militia
members both to train Syrian units and to engage the armed opposition.”235 In Syria in Ruins:

230

Sorenson, Ruins, 99.
Sorenson, Syria, 100.
232
Sorenson, Syria, 101.
233
Sorenson, Ruins, 101.
234
Sorenson, Ruins, 102.
235
Sorenson, Ruins, 101.
231

79

The Dynamics of the Syrian Civil War, David Sorenson argues that it was Iranian aid and
involvement in the conflict, more than any other pro-Assad actor, that helped the Syrian
government forces recover from a tough position during the first few years of the conflict.
Sorensen asserts that Iran has been able to have a strong effect on the conflict because of its
“expertise, experience, and strategic patience.”236
Russia has an old relationship with Syria that started when the USSR began channeling
money into the nation to counter U.S. power in the Middle East. Russia initially responded to the
civil war in Syria with ambivalence; it called for an end to the conflict and even worked with the
U.S. to stop chemical weapons usage.237 In June 2015, however, Putin clarified Russia’s stance,
pledging Russian support for the Assad regime, and ramping up military assistance. 238 Russia
decided to more actively support the Syrian government for a variety of reasons: first, Russia
fears that a defeated Assad could lead to a Syrian failed state; second, Russia needs a friend in
Syria to ensure continued Russian access to its leased port on the Syrian coast; third, supporting
Syria allows Russia to assert power directly against the U.S. and NATO.239 Sorenson argues that
“this is the most important Russian power projection in the region in decades, and it will enhance
Russia’s influence throughout the Levant.”240 Russia also naturally has an interest in combating
IS, partially because it fears an eventual increased terrorist presence in the Caucuses, but
combating the rise and spread of terrorism in the Middle East is not the strongest motivation
behind Russia’s involvement in the civil war.241
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Saudi Arabia is involved in the conflict first and foremost to counter Iranian power. Saudi
Arabia, a Sunni majority nation, opposes the Shia Iranian regime, “arguing that its propagation
of Shia Islam through its self-proclaimed Islamic Revolution [is] a threat to global Islam and that
[it has] a duty to challenge Iranian influence everywhere.”242 Saudi Arabia has heavily funded
opposition groups since the beginning of the conflict, while additionally supporting Houthi
rebels in Yemen, where the civil war has become yet another proxy conflict between Iran and
Saudi Arabia in the region.243
Israel is involved in the conflict in Syria mainly to push back against Iranian power and
the threat that Hezbollah poses to Israeli security and stability. Israel also has a marginal interest
in countering IS, as IS, “constantly [uses] the word ‘Jews’ in its list of the enemies it [promises]
to attack,” though Iran and the Hezbollah present more immediate threats to Israel.244 In early
2013, Israel had already strategically bombed targets in Syria. One incident, a bombing in
Damascus, targeted an Iranian general researching chemical weapons. Notably, Israel has not
taken much of a stance on the Assad regime itself, despite having beaten Syria in no fewer than
four wars.245
Hezbollah is a Lebanese militia that was “founded in the early 1980s after Israeli forces
invaded Lebanon to attack Palestinian Liberation Organization forces.”246 Hezbollah’s influence
inside of Lebanon continued to grow over the following years, giving voice to the oppressed Shia
population within the country. As its power as a Shia militia and political entity grew, so did its
relationship with Shia Iran. Hezbollah now has a strong relationship with Iran, which has helped
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Hezbollah grow its military capacity, to the point that, “[Hezbollah] can… be understood as an
extension of Iranian security policy, poised to support Iranian regional aspirations, which have
included support for the Assad regime.”247 Hezbollah has an interest in the conflict because of its
Shia roots and relationship with Iran, and also because involvement allows the group to assert
power against Israel. This anti-Israeli motive is evident in the moves of both Hezbollah and Iran
to establish positions in the Golan region of Syria, where the nation borders Israel. 248
The interests of European nations, in addition to general humanitarian concern, align with
U.S. interests in most ways. Europe has a vested interest in fighting IS to stop the rise of global
terrorism and it additionally benefits from countering Russian influence and power. Europe
would also, however, greatly gain from stopping or stemming the flow of migrants from Syria, as
the refugee crisis has greatly affected European political stability.
Kurdish militias also play an important role in the war in Syria. At the beginning of the
war, the Kurdish militias formed in a way similar to most rebel groups. These militias were
mobilized by the opportunity to assert their identity, which had been oppressed by Assad’s
regime to the point where Kurdish political parties had been banned since the 1970s.249
Following the outbreak of the civil war, Kurdish militias established several “predominantly
Kurdish regions, home to roughly two million Kurds,” within Syria.250 Kurdish militias,
primarily the YPG, later joined forces with the U.S. coalition to battle IS, motivated to win back
IS-occupied Kurdish territory. The main goal of the Kurds, however, is not extinguishing IS, but
rather regaining Kurdish territory. Kurdish officials in Syria argue that their ultimate goal is
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regional autonomy for Kurds in Syria. In this vein, though the Assad government persecuted the
Kurds prior to the war, the two groups have stayed largely out of each other’s way. A YPG
commander even told Reuters that the group would not protest Assad’s regime if he agreed to
respect Kurdish autonomy within their territories.
The main interest of the Syrian government, and Assad at its helm, is simply to survive.
All of the individual actors it has let join the conflict or even asked to join the conflict, are
strategic allies to help the Syrian government win. Additionally, though the Syrian government
maintains dislike of the Kurds as an ethnic group, it has aided Kurdish fighters in their conflict
with Turkey, allowing them to pass freely through government-held territories.251 While Syria
seems willing to work with the Kurds in service of this shared anti-Turkey objective, the Syrian
government remains reluctant to agree to the autonomy of Kurdish regions.252 The Syrian
government has also ruthlessly profited from ISIS’s entrance into the conflict; Assad knows that
the international community prioritizes beating ISIS over ending his regime and that if it were to
come to it, the international community would choose Assad over the Islamic State. Secure in
that knowledge, Assad has stood back and allowed the international community and opposition
to battle ISIS, expending precious resources and willpower. The Syrian regime, in contrast,
continues trade with IS-held areas, mainly as it relates to oil.253 It is also important to reiterate
the lengths to which the Assad regime is willing to go to in order to win the civil war. The Assad
regime has used chemical weapons against its own people and shown no regret or sympathy
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toward the hundreds of thousands of people, many of them civilians, killed in the civil war, nor
the millions of refugees forced to flee domestically or internationally.
The other two important forces in the war are IS itself, and the various other rebel groups.
IS is not related to Assad or the Syrian civil war; it is an organization with its own aims and
goals that seized upon the civil war to take territory in Syria. With Assad and the other military
groups engaged in chaotic fighting, IS succeeded in taking large swaths of land. IS did not
change the nature of the Syrian civil war necessarily, though it added another layer of conflict to
the already complex situation. Some actors became involved in the war to battle IS, while others
remained strictly interested in supporting or fighting against Assad, and others even were
interested in both objectives simultaneously. Additionally, some actors such as Russia support
Assad but channel resources toward fighting ISIS; others such as Israel are primarily interested
in conflict with Iran and Hezbollah, two subgroups of the conflict, and not particularly interested
in Assad or IS.
It is also important to note that all of the various rebel groups are important actors in this
conflict. They are numerous, splintered, and in search of very different objectives. It falls outside
of the scope of this paper to discuss more actors than those main groups considered above, but it
is important to note for a full understanding of the scenario that hundreds of separate rebel
groups, some valuable in the fight against IS, and others involved in the proxy war, add to the
quagmire of Syria.
In 2015, all of these actors were involved in varying ways in the conflict, and the civil
war had come to a standstill. In response to the stagnation, Russia carried out its first airstrikes
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in the country, claiming to target IS, but actually targeting anti-Assad rebel groups.254 Late in the
same year, and with thanks to the help of external actors, Assad’s forces started to regain
territory, including the major population center of Homs.255 In 2016, bolstered by Russian
airpower and Iranian assistance, Assad’s forces also regained control of Aleppo. During the same
time period, Turkey increased on-the-ground involvement against IS, but also against Kurdish
militia groups. Concurrent to Turkish operations against the YPG, the U.S. was channeling
money and weapons to Kurdish militia groups, hoping they would aid the U.S. objective of
vanquishing IS.256 In early 2017, President Donald Trump undertook his first action involving
Syria, bombing an army base as a reprisal for chemical weapons attacks by Assad against
opposition forces and civilians.257 Only a few months later, U.S.-backed YPG members, in
concert with other opposition forces, began to make serious headway against IS fighters, and in
the fall of 2017, IS was pushed out of its former stronghold at Raqqa.258
By July of 2018, Assad and his allies had recaptured most territory in the country, and by
early 2019, Kurdish militias had forced IS out of their last stronghold in Syria. Trump announced
intentions to remove U.S. troops from the country in response to this seeming defeat of IS in
Syria, and he issued a series of threats to Turkey, offering penalties and retribution if Turkish
forces continued to target Kurds.259 The last obstacle remaining between the Syrian government
and victory is the city of Idlib, a stronghold for rebel groups, though mainly for Haya’t Tahrir alSham (HTS), an al-Qaeda affiliate. An estimated three million civilians have taken shelter in the
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city, most of them internally displaced citizens. Russia and Turkey reached the Sochi Agreement
in September of 2018, to establish a demilitarized zone in and surrounding Idlib. The agreement,
“dictated that heavy weapons, tanks, rocket systems and mortars of all opposition groups would
be withdrawn by October 10, and the zone [would] be monitored by coordinated Turkish and
Russian patrols.”260 The aim of the agreement was that Turkey and Russia, and their allies would
avoid military conflict in Idlib until Turkey could convince HTS rebels and other ‘radical’
groups to leave Idlib.261 The ultimate idea was that, once the main rebel groups had left the city,
some other agreement could be reached that settled the offensive while attempting to mitigate
devastation, particularly for civilians. Turkey was motivated to reach the Sochi Agreement out of
fear that, should a full Russian-Syrian offensive occur, many of these civilians in Idlib would
flee to Turkey. In reaching this agreement, however, Turkey did not say how it planned to
convince radical groups to leave the city, and additionally did not even define exactly what it
meant by ‘radical’ groups. Russia agreed to the demilitarized zone to avoid massive
humanitarian fallout if possible. Ultimately, with Idlib standing as the last rebel stronghold in
Syria, conflict in the city was inevitable but not pressing.
However, as foreseen when the agreement began in September of 2018, Turkey has made
no appreciable progress in convincing radical rebel groups to vacate the city. There is simply no
reason for rebel groups to do so, and Turkey does not have many tools at its disposal to force
their departure. Over the following months, as nothing appeared to be happening, the
international community became increasingly wary that the demilitarized zone was a stalling act,
rather than a tangible step toward avoiding conflict in Idlib. Concurrently, in early 2019 on the
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heels of Trump’s announcement that U.S. forces would be leaving Syria, Erdogan started calling
for the creation of a safe zone. Trump announced via Twitter that U.S. troop withdrawal from
Syria would include the creation of a safe zone. The tweet read, “starting the long overdue
pullout from Syria while hitting the little remaining ISIS territorial caliphate hard, and from
many directions. Will attack again from existing nearby base if it reforms. Will devastate
Turkey economically if they hit Kurds. Create 20 mile safe zone....”262
Turkey wants a safe zone to protect its border from an influx of refugees should Idlib
fall. Additionally, such a safe zone would ensure that Kurdish forces do not encroach upon
Turkish territory following U.S. troop withdrawal and the eventual end of the conflict. It is,
however, not clear why the U.S. wants a safe zone outside of obvious humanitarian concerns,
though some reports suggest the safe zone would only be for Kurds. 263 That notion raises
additional concerns; namely, which Kurds would be allowed, and whether the current
Kurdish regions would be encapsulated within it. It is also unclear why Trump believes that
Kurds would choose to enter the safe zone instead of taking their chances fighting, given
their military prowess and martial culture. Turkey has also suggested that the creation of a
buffer zone or safe zone on Syria’s border with Turkey could create an opportunity to
repatriate the Syrian refugees inside of Turkey. 264 Turkey has also not clarified whether the
proposed zone would be a safe zone or a buffer zone, as both phrases have been used. 265 The
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difference between a safe zone and a buffer zone is a vital concern for humanitarian,
military, and political purposes. As opposed to a safe zone, a buffer zone is, as the U.S.
military defines, “[an] area controlled by a peace operations force… formed to create an area of
separation between disputing or belligerent forces and reduce the risk of renewed conflict.’”266
A buffer zone is first and foremost a military undertaking, whereas a safe zone is a humanitarian
tool.
The U.S. and Turkey are in contact regarding the creation of a safe zone, but the
actors have not reached any conclusions. U.S. Syria envoy James Jeffrey (a position
officially entitled the Secretary’s Special Representative for Syria Engagement) is set to travel
to Turkey, “soon… to try to iron out the details of its safe-zone proposal.” 267 Turkey
demands involvement in the control of whatever zone is implemented and refuses to allow
Kurds to enter it. 268 Accordingly, Erdogan has even threatened that Turkey can undertake the
safe zone by itself if needed. 269 So far, the U.S. has refused to cut ties with the YPG but is
reluctant to agree to a safe zone that does not allow YPG members inside of it. 270 The U.S. is
wavering in its commitment to Kurdish forces, as the relationship between the two actors was
built mainly on fighting IS, a force which is at least momentarily subdued. The U.S.
additionally has no interest in staying in the conflict, which would mean the U.S. would not
play a large role in implementing the safe area. To remedy this problem, the U.S. has tried to
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convince European nations to send troops to undertake the safe zone. It is unclear whether
Trump means for the safe area to be undertaken in concert with Turkey, or independent from
the nation, though it also is not particularly important, as European nations have thus far
refused to send troops. 271
Jeffrey said, “in terms of the Kurds, what we’re working with is with Turkey to have a
safe zone of some length along the Turkish border where there would be no YPG forces, because
Turkey feels very nervous about the YPG and their ties to the PKK.”272 Jeffrey later added, “We
also do not want anyone mishandling our SDF partners, some of whom are Kurds. And so
therefore, we’re working for a solution that will meet everybody’s needs.” Notably, Russia
argues that any safe zone would need to be approved by Assad.273 A Russian spokesperson
asserted, “The question of the presence of a military contingent acting on the authority of a third
country on the territory of a sovereign country and especially Syria must be decided directly by
Damascus.”274 The Syrian government opposes the creation of safe zones by another actor, citing
sovereignty and unity concerns.275
In the meantime, while the U.S. and Turkey have been fighting over a proposed safe zone
that appears to revolve around the Kurds and Turkish interest, the situation in Idlib has
deteriorated greatly. Turkey was unable to convince any of the radical rebel groups to leave the
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city, and Russian and Syrian patience has worn thin. Beginning in early April, Russian and
Syrian forces began shelling Idlib.276 By mid-April, the shelling had not yet risen to the level of
full conflict, but the resumption of violence is concerning.277 It appears to only be a matter of
time until the full battle for Idlib begins. In the meantime, not much has been done to improve
the situation for the civilians taking refuge in the city.

Analysis
The safe zone, as proposed, would help Turkey protect its border from Kurds and oust
Kurds from their current territory in Syria. It would also create a buffer zone between
Turkey’s border and possible refugee outflows from Idlib, and additionally allow Turkey to
repatriate the roughly four million Syrian refugees currently in Turkey. The safe zone could
also fulfill the European objective of stemming refugee flows, though Europe has thus far
been unwilling to play a role in the action. President Trump supports the creation of a safe
area, but not under Turkey’s parameters. The U.S. does not want to accept a safe area that
rejects Kurds and additionally does not want to agree to leaving Turkey with sole
enforcement power for the area of security. It is also unclear what President Trump intends to
accomplish with the safe zone. He could mean for the safe zone to be solely for Kurds to
ensure their safety after U.S. troop withdrawal for counterterrorism purposes. President
Trump could also intend to protect Syrian civilians in concert with Kurds, to save face
following the U.S.’s exit from the conflict. Trump’s motivations remain opaque, possibly
because the administration does not actually have goals for the policy, or at least does not
have goals yet, and questions linger.
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The interests of other actors in the conflict complicate, rather than illuminate, these
questions. Russia maintains that Syria has to approve of any Turkish safe zone, namely
because of the consequences Turkish control of Syrian territory could have. The Syrian
government remains opposed to this idea. It is a slippery slope to allow the Turkish
government to place ground troops in a section of Syrian territory, even if Turkish
motivations seem to involve the Kurds and not Assad’s regime. None of the other important
actors in the conflict, mainly the rebel groups, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Hezbollah,
have commented on the creation of a safe zone in northeastern Turkey. The lack of input on
the parts of these actors is, naturally, tied to their motivations and interests. The few
remaining rebels (excluding the Kurds) are locked in a war with the Syrian government and
its allies that the rebels are going to lose. The groups are focused mainly on these last battles;
the territorial position of the Kurds is of no interest to other rebel groups, as the Kurds are
not really battling Assad. Additionally, the rebel groups’ wishes regarding civilians and
civilian safety are unclear. While rebel groups could have an interest in civilian safety, the
groups could also view a civilian presence in conflict zones as a positive. Civilian presence
buffers rebel groups, if marginally, from the Syrian government and its allies. This
observation is clear in the Russian and Turkish implementation of the demilitarized zone at
Idlib. The large civilian presence in the city, in concert with other considerations, bought the
rebel groups a significant amount of time. At the very least, the rebel groups have larger
concerns than the immediate implementation of the safe zone, and how it would or would not
affect Kurds and civilians.
Iran and Hezbollah, for their parts, are in the conflict solely to support Assad and
project power both as actors and as Shia entities. They have succeeded so far and stand to
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ultimately win the conflict as soon as Idlib falls. In simple terms: Iran and Hezbollah have
already won everything they set out to fight for. There is no reason for either group to
expand their involvement into the questions of safe zones, Kurds, and civilians. Both actors
could have an interest in helping Assad combat Kurdish forces should they retain Syrian
territory following the war, however, there is not an avenue currently available for either Iran
or Hezbollah to pursue those goals. Countering the Kurds in Syria at this moment in time
would mean supporting Sunni Turkey. Similarly, Saudi Arabia has no particular interest in
the Kurds or civilians, either in Idlib or repatriated to Syria. Saudi Arabia is an opposition
supporter for both religious and political reasons, but has clearly accepted Assad winning the
war. This is clear through a lack of increased Saudi military involvement aimed to counter
the Syrian government’s slow march to victory. Saudi Arabia both has no interest in
addressing the safe zone problem and also stands to gain nothing from it. This consideration
of the interests of actors in the conflict further highlights that the main players in question
are Kurdish militias, Turkey, the U.S., and the Syrian government and Russia more
peripherally.
Notably, the only Kurdish interest is retaining territory in Syria following the war.
Erdogan’s obsession with the Kurds is entirely self-serving. He has manufactured a Kurdish
threat to bolster his political power and popularity and to stoke Turkish nationalism. It
should also be clarified that the Kurds are not passive actors in these considerations. They
are an organized group with numerous, powerful militias who have been battling IS in Syria
for years. Additionally, many Kurdish militias are well-armed with American weapons. The
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YPG, and its partner militia, the all-female YPJ, had roughly 60,000 soldiers in 2017.278 For
reference, U.S. troop deployment peaked at 100,000 in Afghanistan, a significantly larger
area than the Kurdish-controlled northeastern corner of Syria. 279 These observations
complicate the idea that the U.S. would need a safe zone to protect Kurds from Turkey; even
if the safe zone was comprised of only Kurdish civilians, why could they not just shelter
behind Kurdish lines? Would the Kurds fight Turkish offensives in a different area than the
safe zone? What if the safe zone is in the heart of Kurdish territory? Or fighting around the
safe zone, but with international troops protecting a collection of Syrian Kurds in the middle
of the fighting? Again, there are no answers available to these questions yet, but they are
worth raising to gain a better understanding of the obstacles of the safe zone plan suggested
by the U.S.
Additionally, while Turkey has more military power than the Kurds, and could and
would beat the Kurds in a conflict, it is unreasonable to expect that the Kurds would not put
up a fight. If the Kurds fought against IS to regain their territory, it is very likely they would
do the same against Turkish forces. There would very likely be a large-scale conflict between
Kurdish and Turkish forces within Syria should Turkey co-opt Kurdish territory for a safe
area.
It is also important to discuss how the interests of the actors involved informs
willingness to overcome challenges in safe zone implementation. It is clear that Turkey’s
interests are large and inform a large amount of will. The problem with Turkish will,
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however, is that it has nothing to do with safe zones or humanitarian aims. It is unclear how
Turkish will to battle the Kurds, and Turkey’s desire to push them out of their current
territory, could translate into the creation of a properly implemented safe zone. Not only is
the Turkish idea of countering the Kurds through the use of a safe zone built on flawed
reasoning, but Turkish attempts to achieve a military objective through this safe zone would
be problematic. It would be problematic because, as proposed, this safe area would protect
four million repatriated Syrian civilians. The repatriated Syrians would presumably later be
joined by whatever number of individuals can flee Idlib, or choose to do so once the fighting
begins in earnest.
Turkey has a vested interest in finding a way to remove destabilizing Syrian refugees
from within its borders. This willingness would theoretically motivate Turkey to implement a
successful safe zone so as to avoid Syrians fleeing back into Turkey. However, Turkey views
the safe area first and foremost as a tactical tool in its war against the Kurds. Implementing
the safe zone in Kurdish territory to force Kurds out of the border region will lead to full scale conflict between Turkish and Kurdish forces. This conflict is likely to revolve around
the territory Turkey has taken from the Kurds; this territory is necessarily the safe zone.
During this full-scale conflict, Turkish military interests will trump Turkish willingness to
ensure the continued safety of the repatriated refugees.
Essentially, Turkey’s current plan will put millions of innocent people at ground zero
of a serious conflict between the Turkish government and Kurdish militias. Additionally,
there is the compounding factor of Assad’s opposition to a safe area, and Russia’s steadfast
support of the Syrian government. It cannot be known how Syria and Russia would respond
to these Turkish actions. Ultimately, while much of this remains unknown, it is clear that
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Turkey’s real goal is countering Kurdish power, and that attempting to achieve that goal
through the avenue of a safe zone would not only be unsuccessful, but could also harm a
large number of civilians.
The U.S. and the international community as a whole also face a moral hazard. The
U.S. has an interest in protecting the Kurds, though it is marginal for two reasons. First, the
immediate threat that created the partnership, IS, has lessened greatly. The U.S. would
theoretically have an interest in maintaining close ties with the Kurds to fight the possible
reemergence of IS. However, given Trump’s announcement that IS has been, “one hundred
percent defeated,” the likelihood of maintained U.S.-Kurdish relations for counterterrorism
purposes is low.280 Second, the U.S. has a history of flip-flopping on support for Kurdish
forces across the Middle East. While Kurds have been valuable partners for the U.S. in
various scenarios, the U.S. has also historically had few qualms in abandoning Kurdish
partnerships. A prominent example of such U.S. behavior has already been covered in the
northern Iraq case study. The U.S. chose to continue arming Hussein’s regime with chemical
weapons to use against Iran, despite the fact that (ignoring the illegality and immorality of
chemical weapons) Hussein was also using those weapons to target U.S.-allied Kurdish
forces and Kurdish civilians in northern Iraq. Through understanding that U.S. commitment
to the Kurds is marginal, or at least easily abandoned, it becomes clear that the U.S.’s actual
interest is in appearing to untangle itself responsibly from Syria. The U.S. wants to save face
internationally after its proclamation of a hasty withdrawal. Trying to ensure that the Kurds
are left in a good position achieves that goal. So does, however, supporting Turkey in the
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creation of a safe zone. This analysis shows that the best way to actually protect the Kurds is
to ensure Erdogan avoids targeting them. However, that is not the course of action the Trump
administration has taken. While Trump’s original tweet suggesting a “20 mile safe zone…”
also threatened economic repercussions for Turkish actions against the Kurds, the dialogue
has since softened.281 With a physical meeting between Turkish and American officials
forthcoming, the U.S. is maintaining opposition to some aspects of Erdogan’s current plan
but has not pursued any methods to ensure Turkey does not undertake operations that would
affect Kurdish populations. The U.S. has not issued serious threats, even in response to
Erdogan’s proclamations that Turkey can and will implement its safe zone plan alone.
Instead, Al-Monitor reports that Jeffrey, “is willing to consider a safe zone inside Syria on the
Turkish border that would include a limited number of Turkish forces but that is free of the
People’s Protection Units.”282
The fact that U.S. diplomats seem willing to work with Turkey to create a safe zone,
even one that excludes Kurds, is evidence of the moral hazard problem in this scenario. The
U.S., as discussed, has an interest to be appearing to do something to mitigate the negative
effects of its withdrawal. This interest of appearing to do something could manifest in
actually doing something, but if there is an opportunity to support another actor in its
undertaking, the U.S. will likely choose to do so. Regardless of moral realities, supporting
another actor will achieve the U.S.’s goal of appearing to take action, while avoiding the
effort, risk, and money of actually implementing a policy. Ultimately, the U.S. and other
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international actors are flirting with supporting Turkish actions even though they will, if
executed, inevitably result in harm.
While all of these dynamics are playing out, the tenuous demilitarization agreement in
Idlib is crumbling, and no actor has taken steps to address the crisis. Russia and Syria
agreeing to the demilitarized zone in Idlib signals their willingness to at least come to the
table for humanitarian negotiations. The international community could even pursue
something as simple and low stakes as a humanitarian corridor. The actors involved in the
conflict could agree to a few days where civilians could leave the city in safety. The
international community would not even have to commit to giving anything to the civilians
after they left the city. Simply offering them a safe way to flee would be a better option than
any they currently have.
Ultimately, the framework set forth by the literature review of this paper, and the
conclusions explored in each of the previous case studies, all point toward the question of
safe zones failing in this scenario. Turkey’s interests in creating the safe zone are impure and
should raise serious red flags as to future full-scale military conflict between Turkey and the
Kurds, which would likely have massive humanitarian consequences. Additionally, the
international community has not been, at large, appropriately wary of Turkey’s call for safe
zones. The international community’s lack of caution is related to the moral hazard Turkish
actions would create. On their surface, these proposed actions could be understood to address
the humanitarian crisis in Syria. Lastly, any moves by Turkey or the U.S. regarding a safe
zone risk further inflaming conflict with Russia and Syria, and waste precious time and
resources that could be channeled toward finding a way to save as many civilian lives in Idlib
as possible.
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Conclusion
Safe zones are such an appealing tool; they conjure grand notions of returning civility
to war zones. In a bleak world increasingly mired in conflict that harms innocent individuals,
the concept of a knight in shining armor− whether it be an international organization, a
multinational coalition, or a single actor− entering a conflict to return dignity and safety to
vulnerable individuals has strong allure. Not only can this entity join the conflict with these
pure, positive intentions in mind, but the actor can implement a simple safe zone, an area of
security where individuals at risk can shelter and have adequate basic resources. The actor
can achieve this without having any sort of larger effect on the conflict because the actor is,
after all, impartial and neutral. The safe area remains a shining beacon of safety and civility,
and all of the parties in the conflict avoid it out of humanitarian respect. Ultimately, this is a
beautiful, compelling idea that plays on very real human heartstrings. Though most of the
analysis in this paper is cynical about the intentions of actors and the outcomes of their
undertakings, this paper is not cynical about the genuine empathy of most people. Faced with
the surplus of violence and sadness in the world, most individuals feel genuine pain and
genuine heartache. When these individuals read about safe zones in the newspaper, or hear
politicians calling for safe zones in conflict areas they have seen covered in brutal news
segments, it is natural to want them to be used and to be used widely. Safe zones, grounded
in their very name, appear to offer a simple, positive solution to humanitarian crises.
These are the very reasons safe zones need to be discussed. They sound so positive,
and so many people with genuinely good intentions support them. However, they directly
caused the death of 8,000 innocent boys and men in Srebrenica. The UN entered the war in
Bosnia and established the safe zone at Srebrenica with only good intentions, but it did not
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understand the dangers of this chosen policy, and its actions gathered tens of thousands of
innocent individuals into a physically vulnerable place. Safe zones, if the international
community does not wake up to their dangers, could be the cause of humanitarian disaster for
literally millions of Syrian refugees. It is important to understand this negative side of safe
zones because the international community, in attempting to make conditions better for
individuals experiencing extreme hardship and danger, can make their situations infinitely
worse. Additionally, actors with bad intentions can easily use the existing system to pursue
self-serving policies with negative humanitarian effects.
The four cases studied above validate the proposed framework as a useful tool for
deconstructing humanitarian interventions, and the use of safe zones in particular. The four
very different cases can all be broken down to their components through a discussion of
interest. Why specifically does an individual actor want to undertake an intervention? The
framework then considers will. Based on why an actor wants to undertake this intervention,
what can be known about its willingness to mobilize troops? How willing is this actor to
organize and execute the practical aspects of the mission? Based on this understanding of
interest and willingness, the framework explores success. If the actor chooses intervention
despite lacking appropriate interest and levels of willingness, what is the outcome? Lastly,
when looking at all of these factors together, the framework discusses moral hazard. Wh at
role did moral hazard play in not only the decisions of the actor to intervene, but also in the
decisions of the international community to support or not support the intervention?
It is clear in these cases that it is very unlikely that an actor possesses adequate
interest to implement a safe zone successfully. It is impossible for an actor to have adequate
willingness to overcome the challenges of the safe zone without a large interest in the
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conflict. Without the willingness to overcome these challenges, the likelihood of the
intervening force mobilizing and deploying an adequate force to actually undertake the safe
zone is null. The cases of Srebrenica and Rwanda show how a lack of interest on the part of
the intervenor informs a low willingness to address challenges. This low willingness
inevitably manifests in an inadequate number of poorly armed troops. In both of these cases,
the safe zones did not remain safe for all of the vulnerable individuals within them .
On the other hand, the only case of a successfully implemented safe zone discussed
was northern Iraq. Actors across the multinational coalition had adequate interest in
intervention, which informed a willingness to address and overcome the challenges of the
situation. The result was a robust, well-armed force creating and protecting an effective safe
zone. However, as discussed, this willingness to overcome challenges was only great enough
because the challenges in the case of northern Iraq were artificially low. These challenges
were artificially low due to the fortuitous circumstances of the intervention. Additionally,
while this analysis shows that successful safe zones are theoretically possible to undertake,
that can only happen with high interest, high willingness, and the mobilization of appropriate
means to overcome challenges. This could have been the case for the Turkish safe zone in
Syria; Turkey has a very high national security and economic interest in repatri ating Syrian
refugees. That interest could have theoretically informed a willingness to undertake the safe
zone correctly. However, Turkish calls for a safe zone are tied up in a military and political
struggle against the Kurds, removing the possibility of creating a successful humanitarian
space.
Despite this set of observations and facts, safe zones persist as a commonly call ed-for
tool of humanitarian intervention because they create a moral hazard for various actors in

100

various ways. The international community views safe zones incorrectly to be a form of
humanitarian intervention that requires less effort and commitment than other forms. This
belief is grounded in the fact that most other forms of humanitarian or diplomatic
intervention require addressing the root cause of a conflict, where safe zones can be a BandAid on the conflict’s effects. However, as this analysis suggests, the lack of interest that led
the actor to choose implementing a safe zone over other forms of intervention in the first
place will inevitably manifest in the safe zone. Despite these facts and the brutal history of
safe zones, the international community continues buying into safe zones because of this
moral hazard. Cynically, actors ignore these objective truths because safe zones continue to
offer them a way to intervene that is fairly cost-effective. If the actor has a greater interest in
appearing to address a conflict than it does in actually addressing the conflict, safe zones
remain an attractive option. Less cynically, even in the face of all of this evidence, many
international actors still believe that safe zones can work, and undertake them as a costeffective tool of intervention in good faith. Additionally, there is no incentive for other actors
in the international community to vocally oppose an actor implementing a safe zone.
Another actor intervening in a conflict, even one with bad intentions or obviously lacking
adequate means, creates a moral hazard for the international community as a whole. If the
international community supports the actor’s intervention, other actors in the international
community are absolved of pressure to intervene themselves.
The application of this framework to these cases makes it clear that there are serious
structural problems with safe zones. The first problem is that states and actors will
essentially never have adequate interests and will to undertake humanitarian intervention
responsibly and well. This argument is both the crux of this argument and the part of it that
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differs most greatly from other considerations of safe zones. Humanitarian Intervention and
Safety Zones: Iraq, Bosnia, and Rwanda by Carol McQueen has, for example, been a
valuable source for this paper. McQueen’s own final conclusion, however, does not align
with the conclusion reached through this research. She asserts that, “Safety zones seem more
likely to succeed…if they are coherent in design; if they are implemented as a clear interim
measure by a single state or multinational force with clear rules of engagement; if they are
integrated into a broader conflict resolution approach; and if they are buttressed by a
sufficiently strong state willingness to enforce them so as to ensure a credible deterrent threat
against possible retributive measures.” 283 What McQueen does not recognize or acknowledge
is that all of the aspects she notes for success in safe zone implementation before state
willingness are products of state willingness. Without state willingness, none of the other
aspects she marked as vital for a successful operation can be attained.
Her analysis of state willingness itself is also flawed; she argues that “[safe zones] let
states do something to protect civilians targeted for slaughter, but let them simultaneously
avoid becoming embroiled in the military conflict underway.” 284 McQueen’s argument is
confused. Protecting the civilians targeted for slaughter is becoming embroiled in the
military conflict underway. An intervening force inherently has to protect civilians from
slaughter by another group. Not recognizing this dynamic sews the seed for safe zone failure.
Entering a conflict without the willingness to become involved in the conflict, and without
the willingness to physically protect the vulnerable group from the belligerent, will not
succeed in protecting the vulnerable group from the belligerent.
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The tension between McQueen’s conclusion and the conclusion of this paper
illuminates the importance of having these discussions about safe zones. Well-informed and
highly experienced individuals like Hillary Clinton call for safe zones, falling into the trap of
thinking they are an easy fix for humanitarian crises. Or maybe some of those individuals
calling for safe zones have a slightly more nuanced understanding of their history, perhaps
they know about the massacre at Srebrenica, but they fall into McQueen’s camp. These
educated individuals assert that safe zones can be successful if they are just done correctly,
and that their historical failures were all due to inadequate or flawed implementation. The
reality of safe zones, however, is that the structure of interest and willingness that need to be
in place for success is unlikely to ever be fulfilled by an actor pursuing humanitarian
intervention.
The longer the international community remains ignorant to these facts or chooses to
feign ignorance of these facts, the longer the most vulnerable individuals in conflict zones
will be endangered by safe zone policy decisions. The case study of Syria makes this
dynamic clear; instead of addressing the humanitarian crisis in Idlib, Turkey is attempting to
institute a doomed safe zone purely in pursuit of domestic interests. The United States is
playing into the plan to save face with the international community.
Ultimately, safe zones are an issue where a broader public understanding is easily
achievable. While a broader public understanding is unlikely to change all of the problematic
aspects of the international system that have allowed safe zones to be implemented for
decades, making more individuals aware of the dangers of safe zones could create a culture
of accountability where none currently exists. At the very least, increased public knowledge
of these issues will pay witness to some of the ways in which the international community
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has harmed vulnerable individuals in conflict zones. This outrage can push back against the
notion of an international community more interested in the appearance of intervention than
the actual humanitarian situation of civilians. Even in the face of inaction by the international
community, this anger can be a testament to the many genuinely good people in the world
who want to help those suffering the greatest.
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